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I. INTRODUCTION
It is now widely accepted that the objective of corporate law and
corporate governance should be to promote the wealth and welfare
of shareholders. Business managers typically profess that they see
themselves as primarily accountable to shareholders, as opposed to
being subject to a responsibility to a wider range of interests,
including those of employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, and
1
local communities. Scholars of corporate law, financial economists,
2
and judges tend to share this view. Shareholder primacy, however,
has not always enjoyed such widespread approval. It is true that since
3
the time of the famous Berle-Dodd debate, the discussion has always
had two sides: some argue for greater accountability on the part of
managers to shareholders, while others favor a larger responsibility of
managers to other “stakeholders” of the corporation and even a
corporate social responsibility to society as a whole.
Large, publicly traded corporations in the middle of the
twentieth century were characterized by managerial capitalism—
managers had taken over as the bearers of the creative
entrepreneurial spirit within the firm and, compared to their
predecessors a generation or two earlier, they were hardly responsible
4
to owners. Economists sometimes saw this as a beneficial advance
over the previous period of economic development characterized by
a focus on founders and founding families, given that the system
5
seemed more rational and stable.
Around 1980, however,
1

See Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning
Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 BUS. LAW. 1435, 1445 (2005) (“[U]ntil quite recently,
the idea that directors might show concern for stakeholders has been associated
mostly with sandals-wearing activists . . . .”).
2
E.g., Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its
Implementation Under Corporate Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2198459 (discussing shareholder wealth maximization as
the objective of corporate law); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea
that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135 (2012).
3
A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049
(1931) (arguing that managers should be accountable to shareholders); Merrick
Dodd, Jr., For whom Are Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1147–48 (1932)
(arguing that managers should have a wider responsibility to society); A. A. Berle, Jr.,
For whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1366–67
(1932) (rebutting the theory asserted by Dodd, supra).
4
See infra Part II.
5
Infra notes 24–31 and accompanying text.
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managerial capitalism began to give way to investor capitalism.
Hostile takeovers and, later, equity-based executive compensation,
began to emerge as the new forces creating incentives for managers
7
to focus on share value.
This Article explores the reasons for this highly consequential
change. It is often thought that shareholder primacy prevailed
because it is more efficient, and managerialism therefore could no
8
longer be maintained under modern economic circumstances.
Relatedly, shareholder primacy is usually explored only as a
phenomenon on the demand side of the capital market, that is, of
the corporate governance of firms. By contrast, this Article argues
that one of the most important reasons for the shift is a fundamental
change in the supply side of the capital market, which has led to the
heightened importance of interests of financial investors.
Specifically, this Article suggests that changes in the pension system
helped to transform corporate governance into a system dominated
by the shareholder interest, to the detriment of the managerial
model. Until the 1970s, workers typically relied on payouts from a
defined benefit (DB) plan for retirement. Employers bore the
investment risk, and designed plans to create incentives to stay with a
9
particular employer. Workers’ human capital and pension wealth
were tied to the employer, thus creating a strong dependence on the
employer’s continued ability to fund the plan. Since the 1970s,
however, DB plans have been losing ground to defined contribution
10
(DC) plans, including 401(k) plans.
These plans have the
advantage of being more portable in the case of a job change, but
workers bear the investment risk. Hence, a large part of the
populace, at least the politically relevant middle class, became
dependent on capital markets for retirement savings, and thus
became, in the words of Chancellor Strine in the Delaware Court of
11
Chancery, “forced capitalists.”

6

E.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 444 (2001).
7
See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 884 (2002)
(suggesting that executive compensation creates incentives to abandon takeover
defenses once the offer price has been bid up).
8
E.g. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 444.
9
See infra Part III.A.
10
Infra Part III.A.
11
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance,
33 J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2007).

GELTER (DO NOT DELETE)

912

5/28/2013 1:25 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:909

These changes in the pension system had consequences on the
structure of the U.S. economy and the importance, nature, and
content of corporate law that are hard to overestimate. First, pension
wealth is no longer tied to the firm, but instead to the capital market.
Second, workers’ incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital
seem to have decreased. In combination, these two shifts have not
only been tied to higher labor mobility, but also to an increasing
importance of pro-shareholder policies to the middle class relative to
pro-labor policies aimed at strengthening employees’ positions with a
12
particular employer. Thus, the appeal of shareholder primacy and
enhanced shareholder rights increased. Ultimately, this is likely the
reason why shareholder power has such widespread support today,
and shareholders are slowly but steadily gaining power at the expense
of boards of directors.
A number of reasons for the rise of shareholder primacy have
previously been advanced.
It is sometimes thought that
13
developments in economics and finance, specifically agency theory,
contributed to an understanding that shareholder primacy was more
efficient than managerial capitalism and delegitimized managers’
14
technocratic expertise. But the relative success of the labor-centric
corporate governance systems of West Germany and Japan in the
1980s rekindled U.S. academics’ interest in foreign corporate law and
15
created doubts about the superiority of U.S. practices. Relatedly, it
is often thought that shareholder primacy is inherently more
efficient, as shown, for example, by the failure of the conglomerate

12

Infra Part IV.
See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)
(establishing agency theory).
14
See PIERRE-YVES GOMEZ & HARRY KORINE, ENTREPRENEURS AND DEMOCRACY: A
POLITICAL THEORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 146–47 (R. Edward Freeman et al.
eds., 2008) (discussing managerial expertise being increasingly questioned due to
more widespread business knowledge); RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO
HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 313–17 (3rd ed., 2010)
(discussing how agency theory undermined the legitimacy of the managerial model);
Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the Berle and Means Corporation, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1121, 1127–30 (2011) (discussing the rise of the shareholder primacy model);
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 449 (citing the “force of logic” as a reason
for the dominance of the shareholder model); Roberta Romano, After the Revolution
in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 343–46 (2005) (discussing the impact of
corporate finance on corporate law and scholarship).
15
E.g., Mark J. Roe, German “Populism” and the Large Public Corporation, 14 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 187 (1994).
13
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16

movement in the 1970s. In this view, shareholder-oriented firms are
inherently more competitive, which is why they eventually began to
17
dominate markets. It has therefore been suggested that the absence
of strong shareholder primacy in the post-World War II decades was
only possible because the U.S. economy was growing and not subject
18
to intense competition.
This Article argues that the social desirability of shareholder
primacy is contingent on specific conditions: pensions must directly
depend on investment success in the capital market, rather than on a
specific employer’s or government’s ability and willingness to keep
paying them. While this is, at its core, an argument of economic
efficiency, this Article also explores changes to the politics of
corporate governance. Though it is clear that a number of factors
affected actual corporate governance reforms through political and
economic channels, this Article argues that the rise of shareholder
primacy was in part an unintended consequence of regulatory
changes in the pension sector. This Article’s argument complements
other explanations that have focused on the growth of the financial
industry and the availability of external debt financing, particularly
19
for takeovers.
Most shareholder primacists would typically argue that the U.S.
corporate governance system does not perfectly implement

16

See KHURANA, supra note 14, at 297–305 (discussing economic distress in the
1970s as a reason for the shift in business culture); Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate
Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65
BUS. LAW. 1, 6–7 (2009) (discussing the inefficiency of conglomerates and mergers
that destroyed shareholder value).
17
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 449–52 (arguing for the superiority
of the shareholder model).
18
E.g., William T. Allen, Engaging Corporate Boards: The Limits of Liability Rules in
Modern Corporate Governance, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOR,
AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 82, 90–91 (Cynthia A. Williams & Peer Zumbansen eds.,
2011); GOMEZ & KORINE, supra note 14, at 137 (explaining that the prosperity of the
post-war decades led to stability in corporate governance arrangements); see also
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
1519, 1524–33 (1997) (suggesting that liberalized trade regimes and capital markets
have shifted income away from labor); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2066–68 (2001)
(suggesting that shareholder primacy is more efficient in competitive markets).
19
E.g., GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED
AMERICA 81–85 (2009) (discussing the role of takeovers in ending managerialism);
John W. Cioffi, Fiduciaries, Federalization, and Finance Capitalism: Berle’s Ambiguous
Legacy and the Collapse of Countervailing Power, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1081, 1106–08
(2011) (discussing takeovers and the rising power of the financial industry in the
1980s); Sanford M. Jacoby, Labor and Finance in the United States, in THE EMBEDDED
FIRM, supra note 18, at 277, 279–89.
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20

shareholder primacy, and often it is not clear if specific reforms
21
While the politics of corporate
actually help shareholders.
governance are complicated, like political scientists such as Peter
Gourevitch and James Shinn, this Article suggests that these reforms
led to a stronger preference of pro-shareholder policies among
22
workers.
Since pro-investor corporate law has become more
important for the middle class, pro-shareholder policies have typically
had the support of the center-left and of unions during the past two
decades, which would previously have been hard to conceive.
Admittedly, the strongest advocates of shareholder activism have in
fact often been institutions managing DB plans, such as unions and
state public pension systems, who became active equity investors
because of the elimination of regulatory restrictions on their
portfolios. These regulatory changes were clearly another factor that
contributed to the spread of the idea of shareholder primacy. Both
developments are two elements of a common trend toward equity
investment.
The increased dependence of retirees on equity
investment strengthened the role of institutional investors across the
board and made pro-shareholder policies more attractive. Drawing
from the labor economics literature, this Article points out how firms
20

E.g. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833 (2005) (arguing, from a shareholder primacy perspective, that
shareholder power should be increased).
21
E.g. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 561, 590 (2006) (arguing that increased shareholder power would be
detrimental to shareholder interests). The SEC’s long-discussed proxy access rule
provides a pertinent example. The SEC has repeatedly issued proposals to amend its
rules in order to expand “shareholder access,” which would have permitted larger
shareholders to place nominees for a limited number of seats on the company’s
proxy statement. The initial proposal was made in 2003. Security Holder Director
Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,785 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003). Section 971 of
the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly gave the SEC authority to pass such a rule, which it did
in the form of Rule 14a-11. This highly controversial rule was struck down by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Bus. Roundtable v. S.E.C., 647 F.3d
1144 (DC Cir. 2011). The SEC subsequently decided not to appeal. See Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement by SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro
on
Proxy
Access
Litigation
(Sept.
6,
2011),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-179.htm.
Regarding the discussion,
see, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L.
REV. 137 (2011); Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY
L. J. 435 (2012) (both doubting the purported beneficial effects of the rule).
22
PETER ALEXIS GOUREVITCH & JAMES J. SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE
CONTROL 220–21 (2005) (suggesting a shift in the political preferences of workers
toward minority shareholder protection); see also ALAN DIGNAM & MICHAEL GALANIS,
THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 66–70 (2009) (discussing retirement
savings of workers as reason for the political importance of shareholders); Davis,
supra note 14, at 1129.
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used the possibility created by these changes to shift how they interact
with workers, and how this shift affected the creation of human
capital. If firms have indeed become more competitive, it is likely
due in part to these changes.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a brief overview
of the move from “managerial” to “shareholder” capitalism that has
so fundamentally transformed the practice and theory of corporate
law, and discusses reasons that have been advanced in the literature.
Part III describes the move from DB to DC plans in retirement
savings and explores the reasons for the shift, which are grounded
primarily in regulatory changes, but are also connected to structural
changes in the U.S. economy. Part IV connects the two issues and
suggests that there is an institutional complementarity between the
pension and corporate governance systems: when many people
effectively depend on capital markets for retirement savings,
shareholder primacy in corporate law is relatively more desirable
from the perspective of workers. Concurrently, with increased labor
mobility and possibly less firm-specific human capital, the significance
of policies protecting workers’ positions with a particular employer
has decreased. While Part IV takes a public policy perspective, Part V
illustrates the effects for the political economy of corporate
governance. Shareholder primacy has become a political cause for
“the man on the street,” and therefore the center-left. Unions
adapted their strategies to this new situation and joined the ranks of
shareholder activists pushing for stronger shareholder rights and
shareholder wealth maximization.
Part VI suggests that an
international comparison with other developed economies confirms
the thesis: continental Europe and Japan, whose corporate
governance systems are known to be more mindful of the interests of
employees and less shareholder-oriented than that of the United
States, also have very different pension systems, in which workers do
not depend on the capital markets for retirement. Part VII
concludes.
II. FROM MANAGERIAL TO SHAREHOLDER CAPITALISM
The American corporate landscape today is very different from
what it was thirty years ago. At least from the 1930s to the 1970s,
corporate governance was characterized by what is often called
“managerial capitalism.” Large corporations were dominated by
extensive managerial hierarchies that were, to some extent, selfreplicating.
Often corporate boards effectively perpetuated
themselves without giving strong weight to the interests of
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23

shareholders. Corporations were truly “Berle-Means” firms, in the
vein of the seminal study by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means,
which identified the “separation of ownership and control” as the
24
defining characteristic of large American firms in their 1933 book.
25
Some economists such as John Kenneth Galbraith and management
26
guru Peter Drucker lent academic support to the proposition that
this was an advancement compared to earlier stages of capitalism
27
dominated by the owners of corporations. In the words of modern
critics Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, it was thought that
“professional corporate managers could serve as disinterested
technocratic fiduciaries who would guide business corporations to
28
perform in ways that would serve the general public interest.” As
Berle explained in a widely noted exchange with law-and-economics
pioneer Henry Manne in 1962, the capital market was hardly an
important constraint on managers in those days, given that contests
for corporate control were unusual and firms rarely needed external
29
equity finance.
While the discussion about the purpose of the
corporation was still dominated by concerns about the role of
30
powerful managers, the idea of the “public interest” role of the
corporation and corporate law remained stronger than today.
Corporate law trailed this ascendance of managerialism, as
23

See DAVIS, supra note 19, at 72–77 (describing managerial dominance during
For
this period); DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM 108–11 (2005).
contemporary accounts of the “managerial revolution,” see ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR.,
THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); JOHN
KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (4th ed. 1985).
24
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 69–118 (1933).
25
GALBRAITH, supra note 23. For a discussion of the goals of the “Galbraithian”
corporation, see Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Evolution of the Modern Corporation:
Corporate Governance Reform in Context, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (working paper
at 32–39), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2136044.
26
See PETER F. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY: THE ANATOMY OF THE INDUSTRIAL
ORDER 340–43 (1950).
27
See Alan Dignam & Michael Galanis, Corporate Governance and the Importance of
Macroeconomic Context, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL. STUD. 201, 222 (2008) (explaining that the
left saw managerialism as positive because it reduced the power of elite families,
while the right welcomed it because society became more meritocratic).
28
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 444; see also O’Kelley, supra note 25,
at 35 (describing how corporate “technostructures” were rarely motivated solely by
profit-making).
29
Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433,
438–47 (1962); see also GORDON DONALDSON, CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 57–70
(1994) (explaining that up to the 1970s, large firms financed expansion projects
through retained earnings rather than stock issues).
30
Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? ShareholderStakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 NYU J. L. & BUS. 641, 671 (2011).
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developments in both statutory and case law made it harder for
31
shareholders to challenge management decisions. Even just before
1980, “corporate governance structures . . . gave the managers of the
large public corporations little reason to focus on shareholder
32
concerns.”
Around 1980, corporations began to move toward a shareholdercentric model, which was brought about by two developments in the
33
institutional structure of corporate governance. Hostile takeovers
34
began to shake up corporate America. Innovations in banking, such
as the development of junk bonds and the proliferation of leveraged
35
buyouts, played an important role. As predicted by Henry Manne in
1965, the threat of being ousted by a hostile bidder created incentives
36
for management to run the company efficiently instead of, say,
engaging in empire building and creating unwieldy conglomerates
that did not contribute to shareholder wealth creation. On the
academic level, agency theory, jump-started by Michael Jensen and
37
William Meckling’s famous 1976 article, found its way into the
academy and into the hearts and minds of economists as well as
business and legal scholars. Hence, a changing paradigm in business
education began to align the professed managerial objective with
38
shareholder wealth maximization.
When the takeover market
declined during the early 1990s, incentive-based executive
compensation began to expand dramatically and to focus more on
31

Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, the Cold War, and
the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
(forthcoming
2013)
(working
paper
at
35–41),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2143397.
32
Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity:
Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 123 (2001).
33
See Davis, supra note 14, at 1127–29; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Folklore of Investor
Capitalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1970, 1973 (1997) (“No one doubts that managements
are much more constrained today by investor preference . . . .”).
34
See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 32, at 124–27 (providing data about the
prevalence of takeovers).
35
See DAVIS, supra note 19, at 81–87; SKEEL, supra note 23, at 111–16; John
Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?—The
Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1755 (2007);
Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 873–74 (2002).
36
Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110, 112–14 (1965).
37
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 13; see also JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE
RATIONAL MARKET 160–71 (2009); KHURANA, supra note 14, at 317–26.
38
See KHURANA, supra note 14, at 305–23; see also DAVIS, supra note 19, at 87–93
(arguing that a shareholder-based corporate governance system replaced a
managerial system); KHURANA, supra note 14, at 297–305 (same); Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 6, at 440–41 (same).
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aligning incentives with share price. Thus, the professed alignment
39
of managers’ interests with shareholder interests remained in place.
Shareholder primacy is of course not free of problems, which
has led to its criticism and, sometimes, outright rejection. First, the
scandals of the early 2000s—such as Enron and WorldCom—have led
to the observation that the contemporary corporate governance
system is inherently unstable due to the large disparity in power
40
between management and diffuse investors. The events leading up
to the current “great recession” have further exacerbated concerns
that at least some aspects of shareholder orientation may have
41
detrimental consequences, particularly in the financial industry.
More fundamentally, it has often been argued that hostile takeovers
and executive compensation, as currently implemented in most firms,
do not actually serve the shareholder interest or that they guide the
incentives of directors too strongly toward short-term share-value
maximization. Some have argued that short-term pressures from
capital markets in general have been a leading cause of the financial
42
crisis.
Second, the shift toward shareholder capitalism has also had an
impact on how firms interact with their employees. Labor power was
at its peak from the 1950s through the 1970s, maybe, in part, because
43
labor was a scarce resource. Looking back in 1994, business scholar
Gordon Donaldson argued that economic and social pressures forced
management to serve the economic interests of all major
constituencies of the firm, including employees, managers, and
44
others. While the pre-1980 structure favored the “career jobholder”
39

Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 884 (suggesting that executive compensation
creates an incentive to bargain for a high bid price); see also Holmstrom & Kaplan,
supra note 32, at 123 (pointing out that pay-for-performance plans before the 1980s
were typically tied to accounting measures and not share price). But see Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON.
PERSP. 71 (2003); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay without Performance:
Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005) (arguing that executive compensation
serves rent-seeking by management).
40
Mark J. Roe, The Inevitable Instability of American Corporate Governance, 1 CORP.
GOV. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005).
41
E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO.
L. J. 247, 269–74 (2010) (suggesting that executive pay packages resulted in excessive
risk-taking in the financial industry).
42
See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265 (2012); Kent Greenfield, The Puzzle of Short-Termism, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 629–30 (2011).
43
See, e.g., DIGNAM & GALANIS, supra note 22, at 200–01, 222–23 (describing labor
bargaining power at its peak); DONALDSON, supra note 29, at 161.
44
DONALDSON, supra note 29, at 19.
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interest in sustained corporate growth, the pendulum subsequently
45
began to swing toward the financial interest of shareholders.
Modern economic theory provides us with an account of why, at least
under certain circumstances, a “balancing board” of the pre-1980
type that is not only beholden to the shareholder interest may, at
least under certain circumstances, be economically efficient. Not
only shareholders, but also other corporate constituencies may be the
corporation’s residual claimants and should therefore be taken into
account in the debate about the overarching goals of corporate
governance. Employees, most of all, are often thought to be relevant
as a matter of policy because of the specific human capital they
46
sometimes contribute. In Blair and Stout’s team production model
of corporate law, the board of directors is seen as a mediating
hierarchy, standing between shareholders and other corporate
constituencies. Without a strong slant in favor of any particular
group, directors are positioned to assign the rents produced by the
corporation to all groups, thus permitting specific investment and
47
allowing long-term business development. Opportunistic “hold up”
of other team members by shareholders with a short-term orientation
48
is therefore made more difficult. In this model, the attenuation of
shareholder control over directors is seen as an advantage, since it
facilitates specific investment by non-shareholder groups and the
49
long-term development of the corporation.
As noted by Jeffrey
45

Id. at 12, 17, 165–68.
See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL
FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 55–59 (2006) (arguing that workers are residual
claimants like shareholders because of pension benefits and their inability to
diversify).
47
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 288–89 (1999); see also Dignam & Galanis, supra note 27, at 221
(“[d]ispersed ownership emerged . . . with a management unconstrained by
shareholders and with a greater discretion to share resources with stakeholders.”);
Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats, 14 J.
MGMT. INQUIRY 96, 99–101 (2005), available at http://bsfrey.ch./articles/412_05.pdf;
Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and
Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129,
136–43 (2009); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113
Q. J. ECON. 387, 404–06, 423–24 (1998).
48
Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789,
795–97 (2007). Institutional investors specifically are often criticized as having shortterm objectives. See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 19, at 285.
49
See Blair & Stout, supra note 47; see also Kent Greenfield, The Impact of “Going
Private” on Corporate Stakeholders, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 75, 86 (2008) (“If
management is more autonomous, it is possible for managers to use their autonomy
to allocate more of the corporate surplus to employees and other stakeholders.”); see
also LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 52–54, 86, 91 (2012) (suggesting a
46
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Gordon, the Blair and Stout story seems to provide a good fit for the
50
role played by the “managerial” board of the 1950s. Firms were
effectively run by top management, particularly CEOs, who had little
reason to emphasize the interests of shareholders over those of other
corporate “constituencies.”
51
Corporate law still reflects the managerialist world;
a
prominent example is the board’s wide discretion to defend against
52
hostile takeovers, which has often been criticized by shareholder
53
primacists. To this day, direct shareholder influence on managerial
decision-making is lower in the United States than in European
54
corporate governance systems. While it would be obviously wrong to
equate shareholder primacy with shareholder power, there are
reasons to believe that pro-shareholder mechanisms such as
“modern” executive compensation are often cosmetic and do not
actually benefit shareholders all that much. But clearly, a lot has
changed since 1980. As Gordon points out, the role of the board of
directors has shifted from a managerial board to the contemporary
monitoring board, whose professed objective is to monitor
55
management on behalf of shareholders. Moreover, the temporary
prevalence of hostile takeovers and the rise of equity-based executive
new line of criticism analogous to the “Tragedy of the Commons,” according to
which shareholder primacy policies may also be harmful because corporations
focusing on shareholder wealth will be more successful in the short run, while
hurting the economy overall by reducing the value of other investments and
depleting long-run development potential).
50
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States 1950–
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1513 (2007).
51
E.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the “Anglo-American”
Corporation, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 579, 593–603 (2010) (describing how Delaware law
remains at least partly committed to managerial governance); Dalia Tsuk Mitchell,
Legitimating Power: The Changing Status of the Board of Directors, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM,
supra note 18, at 60, 76–77.
52
Moran v. Household Int’l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (finding that the
board has the power to issue a poison pill, commonly known as the poison pill, which
is subject to the business judgment rule); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (stating that takeover defense must be “reasonable . . . to
the threat posed”); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995)
(defense must be coercive or preclusive to fail the Unocal test); see, e.g., William T.
Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on
Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1086 (2002) (“Moran . . . and
Unocal . . . upheld the primacy of directorial power . . . .”).
53
E.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It),
26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 512 (2001).
54
Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and
Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 736–50 (2005); Gelter,
supra note 47, at 148–51, 156–61.
55
Gordon, supra note 50, at 1514 n.187.
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compensation must have shifted the balance toward shareholders at
least to some extent, since these instruments set incentives closer to
shareholder interests than to those of employees. But even if all of
these changes were without effect, shareholder primacy has won as an
56
idea explaining how large corporations ought to be governed. All
reform proposals have to be justified in the language of shareholder
primacy.
III. FROM DEFINED BENEFIT TO DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS
A second, maybe even more consequential, shift occurred
during the same period beginning in the 1970s, specifically in the
private pension system. Part A describes the change and provides
data for the transformation of the pension system, and Part B
explores its reasons.
A. The Empirical Facts
In the period approximately between 1920 and the 1970s, large
employers provided a comprehensive set of benefits, such as
57
retirement and health insurance, to workers. Specifically, coverage
with employer-sponsored pension plans increased during the postwar decades, primarily because of the growth of big business, the tax
58
treatment of pensions, and collective bargaining.
Large employers typically introduced pension plans because
unions and employees favored them. Unions pushed for employerprovided pension plans because Social Security benefits were
59
considered grossly inadequate. Social Security, having been created
60
during the New Deal, eroded quickly in the 1940s due to inflation.

56

E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the
Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 717 (1996) (“[T]he shareholder wealth maximization
norm . . . has been fully internalized by American managers.”).
57
David Charny, The Employee Welfare State in Transition, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1601,
1601 (1996).
58
Steven Sass, The Development of Employer Retirement Income Plans: From the
Nineteenth Century to 1980, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT
INCOME 76, 83–85 (Gordon L. Clark & Alicia H. Munnell eds., 2007) [hereinafter:
OXFORD HANDBOOK] (noting a “dramatic” expansion of coverage from 15% in 1940
to approaching 50% in 1980); Munnell, infra note 60, at 363.
59
ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDÉN, COMING UP SHORT: THE CHALLENGE OF
401(K) PLANS 6 (2004).
60
STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 120 (1997); see Alicia H.
Munnell, Employer-Sponsored Plans: The Shift from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution,
in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 58, at 359 (“[V]oluntary employer-sponsored
pensions play a major role in supplementing relatively modest pay-as-you-go public
pensions . . . .”).
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The predominant form of private pension was the DB plan, under
which an employee receives a pension of a specified amount upon
retirement. Employers hoped that DBs would help to attract talented
workers. Unions were equally interested, because they typically
negotiated the plans and were often able to control their
administration when they took the form of a “Taft-Hartley”
61
arrangement.
Generous pension plans were thought to secure
62
union support of labor peace.
An advantage of a DB plan for employees is that it is funded by
63
the employer, who bears the investment risk: when the plan
becomes underfunded, the employer has to fill the gap to allow it to
fulfill specified pension obligations. Employees bear risk when the
plan is underfunded, uninsured, and the employer is financially
64
unable to support it.
Traditional DB plans were designed to create an incentive for
65
employees to stay in the same firm until retirement : benefits were
frequently defined in terms of a percentage of the income in the
highest-paid years of employment, multiplied by a factor increasing
66
with years of service. The strong weight on the last years in the
career, typically the highest earning ones, resulted in an incentive to
67
stay in the same company.
An employee changing his job mid61

See Teresa Ghilarducci, Organized Labor and Pensions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK,
supra note 58, at 380, 391–93; SASS, supra note 60, at 124–42 (discussing the role of
organized labor in the establishment of company pension plans); JAMES A. WOOTEN,
THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 34–39
(2004). Regarding Taft-Hartley plans, see infra Part IV.C.
62
Sass, supra note 58, at 86.
63
E.g., Barry L. Friedman, Individual Accounts and the Continuing Debate over Social
Security Reform in the United States, in RETHINKING THE WELFARE STATE 205, 220 (Martin
Rein & Winfried Schmähl eds., 2004); Leora Friedberg & Michael T. Owyang, Not
Your Father’s Pension Plan: The Rise of 401(k) and Other Defined Contribution Plans, FED.
RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 23.
64
E.g., Friedman, supra note 63, at 220 (noting the risk of employer bankruptcy
in a DB plan); see also Sass, supra note 58, at 87 (“If the employer went bust, so would
the benefits of current and future pensioners.”).
65
See generally RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSION PLANS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE
10–29 (1997) (discussing how DB plans were used to create an implicit contract
between employers and employees that resulted in low turnover).
66
In other cases, benefits were computed on the basis of a fixed dollar amount
for each year of service. E.g., EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP
SOCIETY: HOW THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA 1 (2007);
Munnell, supra note 60, at 365 (giving the example of 1.5% of final three-year
average pay for each year of service, which adds up to 30 % of income for an
employee with a twenty-year employment history with the firm); Edward A. Zelinsky,
The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX REV. 683, 687 (2000).
67
MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 2; Munnell, supra note 60, at 365; Sass,
supra note 58, at 87 (explaining that typically pension claims only vested after ten
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career risked losing substantial benefits. For example, when leaving
the firm at age forty-five with a claim to a monthly pension of onehundred dollars upon retirement, the employee would not lose that
claim, but it would be put on hold until retirement twenty or thirty
68
years later, without any adjustment to the time value of money.
All of this changed in the late 1970s, when employers gradually
began to phase out DB plans and to replace them with DC plans such
69
as the now ubiquitous 401(k) plans. These differ from DB plans in
that the employer does not promise a pension payment based on a
specific formula, but promises solely to make contributions to the
worker’s retirement account. Workers typically have some options
regarding how to direct their investment, and consequently bear the
70
investment risk.
The employer has no subsequent funding
obligation if the plan has no investment success.
While DC plans dominated among pension plans with fewer
than 100 participants even in the 1970s, subsequently DC plans
71
completely eclipsed DB plans among larger plans.
There were
20,035 DB plans and 8,587 DC plans with more than 100 participants
in 1975, but only 11,368 DB plans and 70,125 DC plans with more
than 100 participants in 2006. Figure 1 illustrates how DC plans
72
eclipsed DB plans among large employers in the mid-1980s :

years with the same employer).
68
ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 39–40. The administrative hassle resulting from
switching may have further increased the incentive to stay with a particular firm,
given that claims were not portable and employees needed to deal with all prior
employers when retiring.
69
E.g., WOOTEN, supra note 61, at 278 (“As late as 1979, more than 80% of
individuals who participated in a private retirement plan were in a defined-benefit
plan.”); see also Barry L. Friedman, Individual Accounts and the Continuing Debate Over
Social Security Reform in the United States, in RETHINKING THE WELFARE STATE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PENSION REFORM 205, 220 (Martin Rein & Wilfried Schmähl
eds., 2004).
70
E.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L. J. 451,
458–61 (2004).
71
See generally MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 16.
72
US DEPT. OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN
HISTORICAL
TABLES
AND
GRAPHS
(2009),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1975-2006historicaltables.pdf. The surge in 2005 is
the result of changes in reporting requirements and the Department of Labor’s
counting method. See id. at 31.
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Figure 1: Number of pension plans with 100 or
more participants
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The total number of pension plan participants is perhaps even
more illustrative. As shown in Figure 2, the number of active
73
(contributing) pension plan participants has strongly increased :

Figure 2: Number of active pension plan
participants (in thousands)
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plan.
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Id. at 5. The data also include workers participating both in a DB and a DC
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More than 27 million American workers actively participated in DB
plans in 1975. Their number stagnated to barely less than 20 million
by 2006. By contrast, the number of active DC plan participants rose
from a meager 11 million to almost 66 million.74 In relative terms,
the roles of DB and DC plans reversed: While in 1981, 60% of
pension beneficiaries relied solely on DB plans, in 2001 about 60%
75
only had a DC plan.
The increase in pension plan assets is no less impressive, as
76
shown by Figure 3. Interestingly, the value of assets owned by DB
77
plans remained larger than those of DC plans up to the mid-1990s :

Figure 3: Pension plan assets (in millions of
dollars)
6,000,000
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0
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Defined benefit plans

Defined contribution plans

The development of pension assets is maybe the most interesting
factor because it shows the significance of retirement savings as a
branch of the financial industry that has grown in importance.
Consider Figure 4, which shows the same data as a percentage of the
78
gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States :
74

The total number of members of DB plans increased from about 33 to 42
million, whereas that of DC plans increased from 11.5 to almost 80 million. The
comparison with the number of active members indicates that DB plans are being
phased out, with an increasing proportion of members being retirees.
75
Munnell, supra note 60, at 365–66.
76
US DEPT. OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., supra note 72.
77
A possible reason could be that the last generation of workers relying
primarily on DB began to retire at that time.
78
Christopher Chantrill, US
Gross Domestic Product GDP History,
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Figure 4: Pension assets as a percentage of GDP
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As a percentage of GDP, pension assets increased from less than 16%
in 1975 to 42.42% in 2006, with a peak at more than 47% in 1999.
The increase in the late 1990s and the subsequent sharp downturn
are obviously explained by the dot.com bubble and the stock market
decline when it burst.
Concurrently, the financial dependence of senior citizens on
private pension plans compared to other sources of income increased
from the 1970s to the 1990s; while the share of income from Social
Security payments stayed more or less the same at about 30%, the
share of capital increased from about 30% to 40% from the 1970s to
79
the 1990s.
Thus, only comparing private pensions and Social
80
Security, the relative importance of the latter decreased. Needless
to say, for a vast number of Americans in the lower income brackets,
81
it remains the main source of income after retirement. But for the
U.S.GOVERNNENTSPENDING.COM, http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/us_gdp
_history (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).
79
Sass, supra note 58, at 90; see also Munnell, supra note 60, at 364 (noting that
Social Security typically provides workers with about 30% of pre-retirement income).
80
Jacob S. Hacker, Policy Drift: The Hidden Politics of US Welfare State Retrenchment,
in BEYOND CONTINUITY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED POLITICAL ECONOMIES 40,
69 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2005) (showing a decrease of the
significance of Social Security as a share of combined pension benefits from about
50% in 1970 to less than 40% in 2001).
81
Id. at 64 (“The likelihood that a worker’s employer will offer a pension plan
decreases dramatically with income . . . .”); see ATSUHIRO YAMADA, OECD LABOUR
MKT. & SOC. POLICY OCCASIONAL PAPERS, THE EVOLVING RETIREMENT INCOME PACKAGE
48
(Paper
No.
63,
2002),
available
at
http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/download/5lgsjhvj7qvd.pdf?expires=1365543162&id=id&accn
ame=guest&checksum=F11D6F00C58B231F27F99C7CFEC2B9BE; Sass, supra note
58, at 91 (noting that the bulk of capital earnings accrue to high and middle-income
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middle and upper brackets, private pensions clearly increased in
significance. For the top 40% income earners among retirees, private
82
pensions are a very important source of income.
The 401(k) plan and related pension savings vehicles such as the
independent retirement account (IRA), allow their beneficiaries to
choose and to allocate their pension wealth according to their
personal risk preferences. This provides future retirees with the
83
impression of being in control over their financial well-being and
84
may have contributed to the popularity of such plans. As shown in
Tables 1 and 2, a large proportion of assets both in DB and DC plans
85
are invested in equity :
Table 1. Distribution of DB pension assets
DB
1987
1992
1997
2002
Equity
Bonds
Cash items
Other assets

36.5%
31.6%
10.1%
21.8%

46.5%
28.8%
7.7%
17.0%

51.7%
24.5%
6.6%
17.2%

53.9%
23.2%
3.1%
19.8%

2007
54.4%
22.2%
2.2%
21.3%

2008
41.0%
35.0%
3.6%
20.5%

2009
37.2%
36.9%
3.2%
22.7%

Table 2. Distribution of DC pension assets
DC
Equity
Bonds
Cash items
Other assets

1987
35.4%
15.8%
10.5%
38.3%

1992
38.4%
10.7%
10.8%
40.2%

1997
36.7%
5.9%
6.7%
50.7%

2002
29.2%
10.4%
7.1%
53.3%

2007
29.6%
5.9%
4.3%
60.2%

2008
27.2%
9.5%
6.3%
56.4%

2009
27.5%
8.2%
5.3%
59.0%

In both cases, equity constitutes a large portion of the investment,
whose proportion relative to the total, as can be seen by the decrease
after 2007, is immediately affected by trends in the stock market.
Conspicuously, the share (and absolute amount) of bonds is very
earners, while low-income earners tend to rely on social security to a higher degree).
82
See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH, EDUC., & HUMAN SERVS. DIV.,
RETIREMENT INCOME: IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY AND
PENSION REFORM, S. REP. NO. 97-81, at 25–26 (1997), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97081.pdf (providing data for 1994).
83
See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 71.
84
ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 29–30 (“[T]he defined contribution paradigm
reflects . . . a conception which carries tremendous appeal in a culture which . . .
places a high value on private property, individual autonomy, and self-sufficiency.”).
85
EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., PENSION INVESTMENT REPORT 14 (2010).
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small in DC plans, whereas the share of the “other assets” category,
which includes mutual funds, is very large. Mutual funds, in turn,
86
invest a large proportion of their assets in equity instruments.
Potential retirees are therefore to a greater extent dependent on the
development of the stock market, and to a lesser extent, of the bond
market. The share of equity in DB plans is equally large or even
larger if mutual funds are not taken into account. But from an
employee’s perspective, equity assets of a DB plan are very different.
Given that the employer bears the investment risk, the stock market
does not matter as long as the employer remains solvent.
Equity is popular because it is the only type of investment to
yield profits that are high enough “to make retirement income
87
programs work.”
Employee stock option plans (ESOPs) are a
special case; firms may have good reasons to encourage employees to
invest their retirement assets with them, for instance to create greater
88
identification with the firm and to maximize shareholder wealth, or
to overcome hurdles to bargaining with employees in times of
89
economic transition. Just before the market downturn in 2001, in a
number of large firms—including Proctor & Gamble, Coca-Cola, and
General Electric—more than 75% of 401(k) plan assets consisted of
90
company stock. As a consequence of scandals such as Enron and
WorldCom, in which many employees lost most of their pensions,
investment in company stock has decreased from 19% of all 401(k)
91
assets in 1999 to 9% in 2009.

86

E.g., MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 75.
SASS, supra note 60, at 249.
88
But see Shlomo Benartzi, Richard H. Thaler, Stephen P. Utkus, & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Law and Economics of Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, 50 J. L. & ECON. 45
(2007) (providing evidence that employees systematically underestimate the risk of
holding company stock, while employers overestimate the benefits of ESOPs); see also
Joshua D. Rauh, Own company stock in defined contribution pension plans: A takeover
defense?, 81 J. FIN. ECON. 379 (2006) (suggesting that company stock ownership is,
among other reasons, encouraged by firms because it lowers the chance of success
for hostile takeovers).
89
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employee Stock Ownership in Economic Transitions: The Case of
United Airlines, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE—THE STATE OF THE ART AND
EMERGING RESEARCH, 387, 393–95, 404–06 (Klaus Hopt et al. eds., 1998) (suggesting
that ESOPs sometimes allow firms to trade stock ownership against high wages in
order to make the employee share variable when high profits have become less
certain).
90
David Millon, Enron and the Dark Side of Worker Ownership, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 113, 118 (2002); MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 101.
91
EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 350, 23 (2010); MUNNELL &
SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 113 (providing data stock losses for employees in 12
companies in 2001–2002).
87
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B. Reasons for the Shift
No single explanation has emerged for the shift from DB to DC
plans, but a number of factors that seem to have played a role have
been identified. The most important one is regulatory requirements
intended to protect retirees, which made DB plans unattractive and
costly for employers. Several regulatory choices seem to be jointly
responsible.
1. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
Congress adopted the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) in 1974. ERISA immediately resulted in the termination
of many private benefit plans that became too costly for employers to
92
maintain. ERISA ultimately led the United States down the path
93
toward a “defined contribution society.”
ERISA imposed more severe regulatory burdens on DB plans
than on DC plans. A number of bankruptcies that left employees
without pensions had raised public awareness that employees
94
required better protection against underfunding.
The most
frequently cited example is the 1964 closing of the Studebaker
automobile plant in South Bend, Indiana, which left 8,500 employees
95
with no, or significantly reduced, retirement benefits. Critics argued
that the computation of funding for promised future retirement
benefits was actuarially complex. Management was therefore in the
position to use the resulting uncertainty about pension benefits to
attract workers by sending the signal that the firm was offering high
pensions, while in reality it was uncertain whether their successors
96
several decades down the road would honor this promise.
Congress stepped in with a complicated statute to make sure
employees actually got what they were promised. First, DB plans were
subjected to minimum funding rules, given that DB plans had
97
previously often been woefully underfunded.
Second, ERISA
92

BRUNO STEIN, SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSIONS IN TRANSITION 84–85 (1980)
(discussing and giving data about plan terminations after ERISA).
93
ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 38; see also Sylvester J. Schieber, Richard Dunn, &
David L. Wray, The Future of the Defined Contribution Revolution, in LIVING WITH DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS 273 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Sylvester J. Schieber eds., 1998).
94
SASS, supra note 60, at 202–13 (discussing the legislative process that led to the
enactment of ERISA).
95
See SASS, supra note 60, at 183–86; MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 8;
WOOTEN, supra note 61, at 51–79.
96
Munnell, supra note 60, at 367; ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 43.
97
See, e.g., E. PHILIP DAVIS, PENSION FUNDS 99 (1995); SASS, supra note 60, at 186
(reporting that union-bargained DB plans only had an average funding ratio of
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introduced mandatory vesting standards, under which employees
have non-forfeitable rights to a specified percentage of benefits
98
depending on the number of years of service. Third, firms not only
had to comply with administrative and accounting requirements, but
also contribute to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)
99
to insure pension benefits. Fourth, ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty
100
on trustees managing the plan assets, which exposes employers to a
liability risk. With this heavy burden on DB plans, DC plans became
101
relatively more attractive.
Employers also began to see the potential of selling their stock to
employees in the form of ESOPs in order to align the interests of
102
employees and shareholders. These are easier to set up in the form
of a DC plan, since ERISA established a 10% limit on the acquisition
103
of the employer’s own stock that applies only to DB plans.
2. § 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code
The second important legislative development was § 401(k) of
the Internal Revenue Code, which was adopted by Congress in 1978.
Like ERISA, it was not a conscious regulatory choice intended to
make DC plans more attractive, but was rather intended to solve the
controversy under what circumstances deferred salaries that are paid
into a pension plan should be taxed in the year when work is
performed and the plan is funded, or when the employee receives
104
the actual payment.
60%). Obviously, DC plans are not subject to the funding requirement, given that
employers do not promise a particular benefit that could be funded. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1081(a)(8) (2006) (exempting “individual account plans,”—DC plans—from the
funding requirement); see also PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 13 (2010) (describing additional requirements for DB plans and
legislative motives for the differentiation).
98
29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006), see, e.g., STEIN, supra note 92, at 78–79.
99
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq. (1974);
28 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1311 (2006); see Munnell, supra note 60, at 367; ZELINSKY, supra
note 66, at 44. The PBGC guarantees pension payments only up to a specific amount
that also depends on the age at retirement (with lower guarantee for early retirees).
See Maximum Monthly Guarantee Tables, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP.,
http://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/guaranteed-benefits/maximum-guarantee.html
(last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
100
29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq. (1974); 28 U.S.C. § 1104.
101
See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 9; ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 46.
102
ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 47; see also Gordon, supra note 89, at 393–95, 404–
06 (suggesting that employee ownership allows firms to make part of employee
compensation variable in times of economic transition).
103
29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2); § 1107(b)(1).
104
While the IRS argued for “constructive receipt” of elective deferred pay
arrangements, and hence taxation in the year when the plan is funded, the contrary
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Two aspects further made 401(k) plans more attractive to
employers. First, § 401(k) also allowed matching contributions by the
105
employer to be deductible before taxes.
Given this tax advantage,
companies made matching contributions contingent on employees
106
investing the funds in the employer’s stock.
Second, these plans
typically allow employees to control the funds in their own accounts
and to direct them to investment vehicles in line with their personal
107
preferences.
ERISA encouraged the creation of “participantdirected” DC plans because the employer or other persons
designated as, or deemed to be, fiduciaries are not liable for
108
investment losses that result from the beneficiaries’ choices.
Consequently, participant direction has become very common.
Between 1988 and 2005, the share of participant-directed plans
(among DC plans) increased from 10% to 67%, with these plans now
109
accounting for 86% instead of 15% of participants.
3. The Changing Industrial Structure of the Economy
The regulatory changes discussed so far followed, accompanied,
or accelerated changes in the structure of the economy and how
firms interacted with employees. Labor economists have plausibly
interpreted traditional DB plans and their peculiar design as a way of
managing the workforce. First, private pensions were initially

view held that benefits should be taxed when they are received, i.e. during
retirement, when the employee is typically in a lower tax bracket. ZELINSKY, supra
note 66, at 49–50. Section 401(k) was passed as a compromise between the two
positions by permitting a favorable tax treatment only when the employer
implemented certain social policy goals such as non-discrimination between workers
of different income levels for deferred compensation arrangement. See I.R.C.
§ 401(k)(3), (11) (2006). While it was not initially clear whether the new statute
could apply to pension plans, the IRS clarified the issue in a 1981 regulation.
MICHAEL J. CLOWES, THE MONEY FLOOD: HOW PENSION FUNDS REVOLUTIONIZED
INVESTING 188–90 (2000) (discussing the history of the regulation); MUNNELL &
SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 5.
105
Richard A. Ippolito, Toward Explaining The Growth of Defined Contribution Plans,
34 INDUS. REL. 1, 13–14 (1995); see I.R.C. § 401(m).
106
Millon, supra note 90, at 115; MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 101.
107
ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 51.
108
29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1). It suffices if participants have the choice between
three investment options. See, e.g., WIEDENBECK, supra note 97, at 136–38; ZELINSKY,
supra note 66, at 51; Michael E. Murphy, Pension Plans and the Prospects of Corporate SelfRegulation, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 503, 549 (2007) (“[S]ection 404(c) effectively
relieves the corporate sponsor of fiduciary responsibility for the plan . . . .”).
109
William E. Even & David A. MacPherson, Growth of Participant Direction in
Defined Contribution Plans, 49 INDUS. REL. 190, 196 (2010); see id. at 194, 206
(suggesting that the possibility to escape 404(c) fiduciary liability has played a role,
albeit not the only one); see also Schieber et al., supra note 93, at 275.
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introduced to set incentives for employees to retire at the age
110
Second, as pointed out above, DB plans
preferred by the firm.
111
helped to tie workers to their employer by inhibiting job changes.
Third, the underfunding of DB plans very likely prevented unions
112
from “holding up” the employer.
Underfunding creates a strong
deterrent for unions against driving a very hard bargain vis-à-vis the
employer. A large outflow of assets to current workers would likely
endanger the firm’s future ability to supplement the funding gap,
and thus make it less likely that retirement benefits could be fully
paid. On the other side of the bargaining table, unions tended to
favor DB plans because of the cohesive effects they had on the
workforce and because it put them into the central position of
113
negotiating the DB formula with the employer. Obviously, ERISA’s
funding and vesting requirements made this balance more difficult to
114
sustain; furthermore, the inflation of the 1970s destroyed the
115
amount of the “bond,” namely, the underfunded amount.
These
factors in combination undermined the rationale for DB plans.
Initially, business leaders and unions were skeptical of many
116
regulatory elements proposed for pension reform.
ERISA was
largely the product of eager reformers in Congress who put aside
interest group politics and responded to public opinion, which had
increasingly become concerned about workers left without pensions
117
after bankruptcies.
110

WOOTEN, supra note 61, at 20–21.
Supra Part III.A.
112
Richard A. Ippolito, The Economic Function of Underfunded Pension Plans, 28 J.L.
& ECON. 611, 615–16 (1985). In economic parlance, “hold up” makes reference to a
situation where two actors are in a long-term relationship, in which at least one of
them has made a specific investment on which it expects to receive a return. The
other party can threaten to exit the relationship in order to expropriate the quasirent on the investment. In an employment relationship there may be hold up
opportunities for both parties.
113
ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 33–34.
114
SASS, supra note 60, at 210 (explaining that workers would still get the pension
if union demands bankrupted the employer).
115
Ippolito, supra note 112, at 629.
116
SASS, supra note 60, at 200, 202; WOOTEN, supra note 61, at 100–01 (explaining
resistance by both business and union leaders in an advisory committee rejecting
proposals made by the Kennedy administration in 1963). But see SASS, supra note 60,
at 215 (explaining that by the early 1970s, the CIO had become “the only powerful
interest group that supported reform”). Unions were split on the issue of vesting,
which was seen as desirable by those in industry dominated by single-employer plans,
but was seen as detrimental by unions controlling multi-employer plans. See
WOOTEN, supra note 61, at 142–43.
117
SASS, supra note 60, at 218–19; see also WOOTEN, supra note 61, at 177–78
(describing efforts to obtain union support for ERISA).
111
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The significance of unions generally, and industries in which the
pension bargain of the type described above was struck specifically,
has decreased significantly since the 1970s. Union membership in
the American workforce plummeted from 35% in 1953 to 9% in
118
2003.
Econometric studies have found that about half of the shift
between 1979 and 1989 can be explained by “a reduction in the
employment share in firms and industries that had relatively strong
119
preferences for defined benefit plans.”
Losses for DB plans
120
Thus, DC plans
occurred mainly among non-unionized workers.
also began to be used for personnel management purposes: § 401(k)
121
allows firms to match the additional contributions of workers,
which enables them to reward those with a high propensity to save.
This may allow firms to identify better workers, the theory being that
these individuals are more often able to defer gratification to the
122
future.
Trade liberalization in manufacturing may also have eliminated
rents that could be assigned to labor, and thus led to pressures to cut
123
costs.
Decreased job tenure and stagnant wages further undercut
124
the rationale for DB plans. In part, the shift toward DC plans may
thus have been a response to a development that was already on the
way. At least in part, however, the legislative changes outlined in the
preceding parts contributed to the change independently, since they
led to DB plans becoming less attractive due unintended
consequences of these laws.
4. Redistributive Pension Plan Terminations
The final explanation is the least benign one: during the 1980s,
it became financially attractive for firms to terminate DB pension
118

Ghilarducci, supra note 61, at 384; see also SASS, supra note 60, at 229, 239;
Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 581, 613, 634 (2007).
119
Ippolito, supra note 105, at 18; see also Alan L. Gustman & Thomas L.
Steinmeier, The Stampede Toward Defined Contribution Pension Plans: Fact or Fiction?, 31
INDUS. REL. 361 (1992) (explaining that about half of the shift was caused by changes
in employment in different industries); see also ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 33; see also
SASS, supra note 60, at 229.
120
Ippolito, supra note 105, at 9–10.
121
For instance, a 401(k) plan might have a base contribution of 5% made by the
employee and an additional 5% made by the employer. If the employee decided to
save another percent, the firm can then decide to match that contribution by paying
another (tax-deductible) percent into the plan.
122
See Ippolito, supra note 105, at 14; IPPOLITO, supra note 65, at 85; see also
Richard A. Ippolito, Stayers as “Workers” and “Savers”, 37 J. HUMAN RES. 275 (2002).
123
See Gordon, supra note 18, at 1524–33.
124
See id. at 1544–46.
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plans in a move called “termination for reversion.” Many DB plans
had become overfunded, i.e. the trust held a larger amount of assets
125
than was needed to cover expected pension payments. Firms used
the opportunity to terminate DB plans and create DC plans instead,
while taking the excess value of the plan assets (over the net present
126
value of the pension payments) into corporate profits.
Legally,
plan terminations were made possible by a 1983 ruling by the IRS
(encouraged by the Department of Labor), which clarified that plan
terminations were permissible not only in narrow cases of “business
necessity,” but also generally, as long as the employer bought an
127
annuity for the existing benefits from an insurance company.
In the words of the labor economist Richard Ippolito, the
“ruling dramatically altered the defined benefit pension contract,”
since it allowed employers to terminate plans outside of financial
128
distress in order to create profits. For workers, a termination meant
that future payouts no longer depended on their salaries at the end
125

One major reason was high interest rates that depressed the discounted value
of pensions. Mitchell A. Petersen, Pension Reversions and Worker-Stockholder Wealth
Transfers, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1033, 1035 (1992); Margaret M. Blair, The Great Pension Grab:
Comments on Richard Ippolito, Bankruptcy and Workers: Risks, Compensation and Pension
Contracts, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 1305, 1307 (2004). In the 1990s, a soaring stock market
continued to make DB plans look overfunded in spite of lower interest rates.
126
Richard A. Ippolito, Tenuous Property Rights: The unraveling of defined benefit
contracts in the US, in PENSION POLICY IN AN INTEGRATING EUROPE 175, 176 (Onorato
Castellino & Elsa Fornero eds., 2003);
see also Norman P. Stein, Reversions from Pension Plans: History, Policies, and Prospects, 44
TAX L. REV. 259, 277–79 (1989) (surveying legal methods of pension plan
terminations under the tax code).
127
See Ippolito, supra note 126. Until 1983, the Internal Revenue Code had
prohibited payouts to employers until all employee claims were satisfied. 26 I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(2). Funds remaining in the plan could only be captured by the employer in
cases of actuarial error. 25 C.F.R. § 1.401-2(b)(1). A termination was permissible
only in narrowly defined situations of “business necessity” (i.e. financial distress).
Rev. Rul. 71-152, 1971-1 C.B. 126 (1971); Richard A. Ippolito, Bankruptcy and Workers:
Risks, Compensation and Pension Contracts, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 1251, 1287 (2004); see also
Stein, supra note 126, at 261, 293 (discussing the historical context of the ruling).
The IRS’s 1983 ruling made it clear that plan terminations purely made for the
purpose of capturing a reversion were permissible if the employer bought an annuity
for the existing benefits from an insurance company. Rev. Rul. 83-52, 1983-1 C.B. 87
(1983). See Ippolito, supra note 126; WIEDENBECK, supra note 97, at 279; Stein, supra
note 126, at 261–62, 282. It also allowed firms to use less conservative assumptions
when computing a plan’s amount of liabilities. See Stein, supra note 126, at 305–06.
128
Ippolito, supra note 127, at 1287; see also Charny, supra note 57, at 1613, 1629
(suggesting that employers reneged on implicit deals with workers by cutting benefits
after LBOs); Stein, supra note 126, at 262 (explaining that the 1983 ruling reflected a
new understanding of the tax code that protected only employee benefits accrued at
the time of termination, but did not protect expectations under an implicit contract
relating to future wage increases and adjustment to inflation).
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of their careers, but rather at the time of the plan’s termination.
Furthermore, the funding risk for future pension contributions was
130
shifted from shareholders to employees (and the PBGC).
131
Terminations often happened after a leveraged buyout (LBO),
an acquisition that burdens the target firm with debt taken out to
finance the purchase. Not only do LBOs often create strong
pressures to cut costs at the expense of employees, but reversions in
particular were seen as permitting raiders to violate implicit contracts
with workers by taking the profit instead of using it to enhance
132
pension benefits.
In many cases, reversions seem to have resulted
in considerable redistribution from workers to shareholders, since
employees seemingly were not compensated for the higher risk of
133
default.
There were about 585 terminations between 1980 and
134
1985, and more than 1,500 in 1986 alone. Between 1980 and 1989,
1,635 plans were terminated, yielding an aggregate of $18 billion
135
(corresponding to 45% of these plans’ assets) to employers.
Admittedly, most DB plans were shut down in the context of factory
closures, but about one-third were pure asset reversions that seem to
136
support a redistributive theory.
From 1986 onwards, Congress attempted to protect plans from
137
terminations by imposing a reversion tax.
The long-term effect,
however, was to make DB plans even more unattractive to
138
employers.
Employers reacted by reducing the target funding
129

Richard A. Ippolito & William H. James, LBO, Reversions, and Implicit Contracts,
47 J. FIN. 139, 142 (1992); Stein, supra note 126, at 276.
130
Blair, supra note 125, at 1306–07.
131
Ippolito & James, supra note 129; see also CLOWES, supra note 104, at 187–88
(discussing individual cases of LBO-financed plan reversions).
132
Gordon, supra note 18, at 1543.
133
See Blair, supra note 125, at 1308–09 (discussing the relative costs of riskbearing incurred by shareholders and employees).
134
Ippolito, supra note 126, at 177.
135
Stein, supra note 126, at 259–60.
136
Ippolito, supra note 126, at 182; see also Petersen, supra note 125, at 1052 (firms
where the pension bond is the largest are most likely to be affected by a reversion,
which lends support to the transfer theory).
137
Richard A. Ippolito, Reversion Taxes, Contingent Benefits, and the Decline in
Pension Funding, 44 J.L. & ECON. 199, 200 (2001). The tax was originally 10%, but
subsequently increased to 15% in 1988 and to 50% in 1990. Ippolito, supra note 127,
at 1288; Stein, supra note 126, at 262–63, 320.
138
Ippolito, supra note 137, at 203–04 (explaining that the reversion tax
discourages excess funding of DB plans because it makes it expensive to remove
excess assets). Ippolito also points out that Congress, in 1986, passed legislation that
disallowed overfunding a plan by more than 150% (without losing the associated tax
benefits), although the effect of the limit is small compared to the tax. Id. at 204,
218–19; I.R.C. § 412(c)(7); 29 U.S.C. § 1082(c)(7), as amended by P.L. 100-203, Dec.
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ratios and ultimately by converting DB plans into cash balance plans,
139
allowing them to avoid the tax penalty.
IV. EFFECTS ON EMPLOYEES’ HUMAN CAPITAL AND PENSION WEALTH
The transformation of the American pension system came about
not through deliberate planning, but largely as an unintended
consequence of regulation that was primarily intended to protect
140
workers. This Part proceeds by explaining why this had important
consequences for both workers and corporate governance, describes
the tradeoff between the two assets employees have in an
employment relationship—namely human capital and pension
wealth (discussed in Part IV.A), and explains their exposure to
varying risks under different pension systems (Parts IV.B and IV.C).
Parts IV.D and IV.E retrace the changes in the tradeoff resulting from
the shift from DB to DC plans and suggest that this fundamentally
changed the impact pro-investor corporate governance policies have
on workers.
A. The Tradeoff
Consider the situation of a middle-class employee. Very broadly
speaking, most of us cover our living expenses from two sources.
First, we typically rely on a constant income stream to make a living,
most of which comes from employed labor. We therefore care not
only about our current job, but also about our education, skills, and
22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1330.
139
Ippolito, supra note 127, at 1288–89. While cash balance plans are formally
DB plans where the employer guarantees a specified amount, each employee is
assigned a fictitious account with a monetary value corresponding to his pension
claim, thus making the plan look much like a DC plan. E.g., Friedman, supra note
63, at 221; GEORGE A. (SANDY) MACKENZIE, THE DECLINE OF THE TRADITIONAL PENSION
55 (2010). A conversion is therefore not considered a termination, but an
amendment to the plan. Ippolito, supra note 127, at 1289 n.41.
140
Once the idea was established, investment vehicles functioning on the same
principle were created and began to spread widely. Individual retirement accounts
(IRAs), which are endowed with tax advantages to provide similar tax advantages for
individuals not covered by pension plans, became available as an investment vehicle
to anyone in 1981. Economic Recovery Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 97-34 (1981). Even
though their tax advantages were again limited to low-income earners in 1986 (Tax
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 99-514 (1986)), but they continued to proliferate. ZELINSKY,
supra note 66, at 52–58. Other examples include health savings accounts, which
allow those that have high-deductible health insurance to save for medical expenses,
and Educational Savings Accounts. See Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement
and Modernization Act, P.L. 108-173 (2003) (superseding the older Medical Savings
Accounts); I.R.C. § 529 (educational savings accounts). See also ZELINSKY, supra note
66, at 60–70, 83–84 (discussing various types of investment vehicles). In each case,
the investment risk is borne by the individual.
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abilities; in other words, the potential to earn a living in the future.
The expected present value from this can be referred to as our
141
human capital in a broad sense, and we should deeply care about
policies affecting our earnings potential. Second, we rely on savings
to cover our expenses when we fall on hard times, such as a period of
unemployment, or when we are no longer able or willing to work.
Retirement savings are the most important component.
We
therefore care about policies that affect our pension plans, which is
why it is valuable to explore both human and financial capital more
deeply. The tradeoff between these two sources is of crucial
importance to the shareholder primacy debate. Employees’ human
capital interest, resulting from rent-seeking or returns on specific
human capital investment, is generally less secure when managers in
a corporation are strongly focused on maximizing shareholder
wealth. Because of the rise of DC plans, however, pro-shareholder
policies have gained in relative importance compared to proemployee policies that protect their position with a particular
employer.
B. Human Capital and Pension Plans
Employees typically prefer to stay at their current jobs unless
others offer clear advantages. There are basically two possible
reasons for this. First, employees may be able to extract rents from
their employers. It is often costly for employers to hire and train new
employees. Incumbents may therefore have some bargaining power
to obtain wages and benefits above their marginal product. Unions
and legal institutions that enhance employees’ power may allow
employees to organize and to extract rents from employers
142
collectively.
In a corporation, these rents reduce profits for
shareholders.
Second, employees may have a human capital investment in
their current jobs in the form of skills and training. According to
economic theory, human capital can be general, i.e. useful in a wide
range of occupations. It can be industry-specific, meaning that the
acquired skills are applicable across a range of similar or equivalent
jobs in different firms. It can also be firm-specific, meaning that it is
141

See, generally, Burton A. Weisbrod, The Valuation of Human Capital, 69 J. POL.
ECON. 425, 427 (1961) (defining human capital as expected future earnings).
142
Much of the corporate law literature seems to favor this interpretation. E.g.,
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence and Corporate
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 150 (1999) (suggesting that German
codetermination allows unions to extract rents from shareholders).

GELTER (DO NOT DELETE)

938

5/28/2013 1:25 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:909

143

useful with a particular employer.
Firm-specific investment is
beneficial when workers are able to do their jobs more quickly and
efficiently, make fewer mistakes, and create higher-quality products,
144
thus rendering the firm more competitive.
Firm-specific human
capital obviously includes skills to perform a particular job, e.g. to use
a particular machine. Few skills may be useful to only one
employment relationship, but idiosyncratic combinations of skills
145
may be. In this case, particular subsets of skills, but not the whole
package, may be transferable given that no other job requires the
same combination. In other cases, the employee’s specific skill may
be of an organizational nature. In the context of pension contracts,
Richard Ippolito gives the example of a worker who “has worked with
the same people for a long time, and really knows how to create
146
teams that work together for different types of jobs.”
In other
words, employees may also need to learn to work within a different
corporate culture or organizational structure and how to navigate it
147
to be as effective as possible.
The role of pension plans in the employer-employee
relationship depends on who pays for the creation of human capital.
If the employer pays for the employee’s training, he will want to make
sure that the employee stays at least until the employer has recovered
his investment. Individual employees can threaten to leave in order
148
to extract higher wages or other advantages from the employer. If a
143

GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 11–36 (1964); see also HENRY HANSMANN, THE
OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 26 (1996); James M. Malcomson, Individual Employment
Contracts, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2291, 2311–37 (Orley Aschenfelter &
David Card eds., 1999) (reviewing the literature on contractual protection of specific
investment); David Neumark, Productivity, Compensation, and Retirement, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK, supra note 58, at 721, 722; Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, Does good
corporate governance include employee representation? Evidence from German corporate boards,
82 J. FIN. ECON. 673, 679 (2006).
144
See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Toward a New Law and Economics, GEO. WASH.
LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO. 495, at 51 (2010) (suggesting that firms financed by
venture capitalists thrive when there is substantial human capital in these firms),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1557730.
145
EDWARD P. LAZEAR, INSIDE THE FIRM 342 (2011) (giving the example of work in
a tax software company requiring knowledge of computer programming, economics,
and tax law).
146
Ippolito, supra note 127, at 1254; see also Egon Franck, Stephan Nüesch, & Jan
Pieper, Specific Human Capital as a Source of Superior Team Performance, 63
SCHMALENBACH BUS. REV. 376, 377–81 (2011) (discussing team-specific capital).
147
John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web,
85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 74 (1986).
148
See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the
Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 509–16 (1999)
(suggesting that Japanese firms are able invest in employee training because these
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trained group of employees is hard to replace, unions are in a good
position to engage in rent-seeking. DB pension plans tie employees
to the employer and make it more difficult for them to “hold up” the
firm; before ERISA, DB plans penalized individual employees who
149
switched jobs.
On the collective level, pervasive underfunding of
150
DB plans made it more difficult for unions to drive a hard bargain.
Thus, pension arrangements in effect turned industry-specific skills
into firm-specific skills, and consequently reduced employees’
potential to extract rents from the firm. ERISA made this kind of
151
arrangement impossible.
If the cost of the creation of firm-specific human capital is borne
by employees, the situation is different. Employees will only be
willing to invest if there is a return, such as higher future wages,
expanded benefits after a period of continuous employment, and a
152
high likelihood of advancing in the corporate hierarchy. They may
have an expectation to make a certain income within the firm, enjoy
particular working conditions and benefits, and have certain career
prospects if they do a good job. From the perspective of human
capital theory, all of these expectations are considered (quasi-)rents
on an investment made early in the employment relationship. A
related, but not entirely identical issue is that employees may need to
move to obtain a particular job. Employers often cover relocation
expenses to attract employees, since being in a particular location
153
may also turn industry-specific skills into firm-specific ones.
Some
of the costs may not be recoverable, such as those of reorganizing
154
Thus, while employees are in principle free to
one’s social life.
switch jobs, they may be de facto “locked in” with their current
have no outside career options).
149
Supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
150
Supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text.
151
Furthermore, firms may prefer to confer benefits only to long-term, high-skill
employees. ERISA’s non-discrimination requirement prevents firms from targeting
specific types of employees. Charny, supra note 57, at 1622–23.
152
See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile
Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 37 (ALAN J.
AUERBACH ed., 1988) (discussing implicit contracts between firms and employees);
Charny, supra note 57, at 1606–07, 1608 (discussing the use of pension to encourage
investment in employer-specific skills by employees).
153
See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 35 (1994) (quoting an engineer comparing the
difficulty of getting another job in the same industry in Texas and in Silicon Valley).
154
In this context, economists speak of regionally immobile “social capital” that
reduces worker mobility. See Michael Bräuninger & Andreia Tolciu, Should I Stay or
Should I Go? Regional Mobility and Social Capital, 167 J. INST. & THEOR. ECON. 434, 434–
36 (2011).
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employer. Moving to a job in another region where the same skill set
is required may be deterred by the cost of moving.
The question, then, is how employees can obtain reasonable
assurance that employers will not renege on worker expectations and
engage in what is known as “hold up” in economic terminology. As
explained above, under the team production model of corporate law,
the board of directors is in the position to balance the interests of the
firm’s various constituencies. The board, therefore, may protect
employees by shutting out shareholders, who may engage in holdup,
155
from decision-making. This fits well with descriptions of how firms
operated from the 1950s through the 1970s: the institutional goal of
firms was not so much profit maximization as growth and continued
survival. Employees were fired less easily because of the demoralizing
156
effects on the team.
In the labor economics literature, DB pension plans add another
angle to the analysis, namely as part of a long-term, partly implicit
157
contract that rewards loyalty with wages that increase with seniority.
DB plans create an incentive for promotion-achieving performance
and firm-specific investment, given that they reward a long tenure in
the firm and because pension payments depend on late-career salary
158
(typically resulting from promotion within the firm).
This is
plausible when pension plans cannot be terminated because of legal
hurdles, when they are entrenched because of deals with powerful
unions, and when a managerialist board has no incentive to cut labor
cost in order to create shareholder wealth.
For the descriptive point about shareholder primacy, it is
relatively unimportant whether the rent-seeking explanation or the
159
human capital explanation is empirically more significant.
It
suffices to realize that employment constitutes an asset. This asset’s
value is the net present value of expected income streams—from
155

Supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text.
O’Kelley, supra note 25, at 35–36 (describing the goals of the “Galbraithian”
technostructure).
157
Edward P. Lazear, Why is There Mandatory Retirement?, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1261
(1979); Edward P. Lazear, The Future of Personnel Economics, 110 ECON. J. F611, F617–
F619 (2000); Friedberg & Owyang, supra note 63, at 27; Neumark, supra note 143, at
723–24.
158
See, e.g., Neumark, supra note 143, at 724–25 (discussing the incentive set by
DB plans for specific human capital investment); MACKENZIE, supra note 139, at 48–49
(“Final-salary pension plans . . . create a powerful incentive for strong (or at least
promotion achieving) performance on the job and loyalty to the firm, and reward
the build-up of know-how that is specific to the firm.”).
159
See Neumark, supra note 143, at 725–26 (surveying the evidence for various
theories about human capital).
156
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future wages, benefits, and vacation time—in the current job, minus
160
the equivalent income streams in the next best job. Margaret Blair
estimates that the value of a job is considerable for employees, given
that employees who are laid off in the course of a plant closing
161
typically earn 10–15% less in their subsequent jobs.
This figure
should realistically vary between jobs, and it should be greater for
employees with either better rent-seeking opportunities at the firm,
or greater specific investment and therefore expectations to receive
162
quasi-rents from continued employment.
The bottom line for
analyzing the politics of corporate governance is that employees have
a desire to keep their jobs, and to support policies that foster and
protect returns on their human capital.
C. The Exposure of Pension Wealth to Risk
While policies relating to their employment position are clearly
important to workers, expected retirement benefits are their other
major asset. There are clear differences between DB and DC plans
that influence employee preferences with respect to policies relating
to pension wealth.
In a DB plan, the employer bears the plan’s funding risk. The
major issue for employees is plan underfunding combined with the
risk of the employer’s default. ERISA addressed the issue with the
163
requirement to set up a trust to hold pension assets.
While firms
164
had begun to set up trusts for tax reasons decades earlier, they were
often underfunded. Previously, employees had to hope that the firm
stayed in business and continued to fund the plan; in other words,
one of the main risks for employees was whether the firm would
continue to honor its commitment and avoid going into

160

Ippolito, supra note 127, at 1253. Rationally, an employee would only switch
jobs if the value of another job minus the cost of switching exceeds the value of the
current one. Id. at 1254.
161
Blair, supra note 125, at 1310.
162
Unionization can also be a possible consequence of or reason for firm-specific
investment, since unions protect employees’ rents and quasi-rents. Unionization
rates tend to be higher in manufacturing, where implicit deals with workers and
specific investment are sometimes thought to be more common. E.g., Charny, supra
note 57, at 1625–26.
163
29 U.S.C. § 1103 (2006).
164
John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of
Commerce, 107 YALE L. J. 165, 169 (1997). By contrast, in some European countries
such as Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden, and Austria, firms often commit to paying
retirement benefits directly, and thus need to fund provisions for future payments in
their balance sheets. GORDON L. CLARK, PENSION FUND CAPITALISM 59–60 (2000)
(discussing “book reserve” plans in Germany).
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165

bankruptcy. Even with the insurance provided by the PBGC today,
beneficiaries of a DB plan run the risk of losing the uninsured
portion of the plan when the firm is not financially solvent and the
plan becomes underfunded (for instance, because of a capital market
166
downturn). If firms are unable to fill the funding gap at that time,
167
employees may lose a portion of their pension.
Risks for employees are different in today’s DC world. On the
one hand, 401(k) plans are individual accounts that are controlled by
the beneficiary, who can transfer them to a new employer’s plan or
shift the assets into an IRA. This reduces switching costs and the
degree to which employees are tied to a particular employer. On the
other hand, with a DC plan, potential retirees bear the investment
risk because the employer does not have to jump in if the plan assets
do not suffice to meet pension obligations.
The amount of funds available for retirement depends on
168
investment success.
DC plans such as 401(k)s and IRAs (often
169
consisting of 401(k) assets rolled over after a job change) are
invested in publicly-traded securities. The share of investment in
stocks strongly increased at least between 1989 and 2001, when more
170
than half of 401(k) plans reported to invest “mostly in stock.”
Consequently, it is important for future retirees that capital
markets—in particular equity markets—are doing well. In the bull
markets of the 1980s and 1990s, and even in the years after the 2002
financial scandals, many employees did quite well and accumulated a
significant retirement bonus. The financial crisis that started in 2008
showed the downside of the defined contribution society: pension
assets were flattened, which made it difficult for many to retire as
171
planned.
Thus, in theory, a DC plan should eliminate the
165

E.g., Friedman, supra note 63, at 220 (noting the risk of employer bankruptcy
in a defined benefit plan); see also Sass, supra note 58, at 87 (“If the employer went
bust, so would the benefits of current and future pensioners . . . .”); MACKENZIE, supra
note 139, at 53.
166
Supra note 99 and accompanying text.
167
Friedman, supra note 63, at 220.
168
E.g., MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 68.
169
MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 69.
170
Andrew A. Samwick & Jonathan Skinner, How Will 401(k) Pension Plans Affect
Retirement Income?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 329, 333–34 (2004) (reporting an increase of
investment “mostly in stocks” from 23.69% to 54.54% between 1989 and 2001, and a
decrease of investment “mostly in bonds” from 39.52% to 10.31%).
171
See, e.g., Edward Whitehouse, Anna D’Addio & Andrew Reilly, Investment Risk
and Pensions: Impact on Individual Retirement Incomes and Government Budgets, OECD
SOCIAL, EMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION WORKING PAPERS No. 87, 47 (2009) (“Pension
funds lost 23% of their value in OECD countries in 2008 . . . .”).
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employee’s risk-bearing with respect to the bankruptcy of the
employer, since it is not involved in pension payments other than in a
DB plan. That, however, assumes that retirement accounts are
properly diversified. During the boom years, many firms encouraged
employees to invest in the firms’ own shares, often in the form of
ESOPs. But even normal retirement accounts were often weighed
heavily in favor of the employer, partly because employers often only
matched employee contributions that were invested in their own
stock. Obviously, putting retirement assets into ESOPs makes
employees bear the risk of the development of their employers’ stock.
Excessive investment in company stock has led to disaster for some
employees in cases such as Enron, where many lost much of their
172
retirement savings.
Of course, stock market downturns also affect
DB plans; DB plans become less liquid, and it may become harder to
make pension payments due to liquidity constraints. In severe cases,
173
the sponsoring firm may have to pitch in to close the funding gap.
The financial crisis of 2008–2009 has severely impacted the
remaining DB plans, forcing firms to reduce shareholders’ equity by
174
putting funding liabilities on their balance sheets.
Thus, the core difference in the employee’s financial position is
that, in a DC plan, an employee is a shareholder, namely either a
diversified investor in the capital market or in his own employer
through an ESOP. In the case of well-diversified investment,
employees should no longer have a strong interest in the employer’s
financial well-being, except to the extent that it protects their human
175
capital. If the pension plan is heavily invested in the employer, the
employee becomes a long-term shareholder, strongly dependent on
the firm’s long-term development.
By contrast, in a DB plan the position of the employee compares
to that of a bondholder of the employer, specifically a secured
bondholder to the extent of the guarantee by the PBGC and that of

172

See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 113 (providing statistics about cases
where significant amounts of retirement assets were lost, and discussing Enron in
more detail); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of
the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1248–49
(2002) (describing the retirement problem of Enron employees); Millon, supra note
90, at 119.
173
See OECD, PRIVATE PENSIONS OUTLOOK 2008, 18–19 (2009).
174
James J. Hanks, Jr., Legal Capital and the Model Business Corporation Act: An Essay
for Bayless Manning, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 229–30 (2011).
175
The overall well-being of the respective industry should still matter to the
individual employee, as long as he has industry-specific human capital, and to unions
hoping to maintain membership.
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an unsecured bondholder for additional amounts.
The employee
depends on the employer to meet his obligations and to continue to
177
fund plans, and is subject to the risk of opportunistic benefit cuts.
Like a bondholder, employees do not participate in general upswings
178
in the economy that elevate values above the promised amount and
179
are also subject to the risk of inflation.
D. Shifting Employee Interests
Even assuming a constant level of human capital investment
during the past thirty years, the shift from DB to DC plans must have
had consequences for what policies are in the interest of employees,
particularly when shareholder interests and employee interests
180
conflict.
Employees depend less on their employer for their
financial capital, and more strongly on the capital market. For many
families, their 401(k) plans represent the bulk of the available
181
financial assets and thus determine financial security in retirement.
Capital markets have therefore become very important for the middle
class.
The classic shareholder-labor controversy of this type is whether
managers should be allowed to defend against hostile takeovers. By
default, both managers and workers would prefer a “quiet life,”
meaning an absence of hostile takeovers disrupting their routine and
182
putting their jobs at risk. A takeover puts employees at risk since it
often results in significant restructuring of the enterprise, which
176

Ippolito, supra note 127, at 1258–59; Shigeto Kashiwazaki & Hiroharu
Fukazawa, Current Situation and Issues of Retirement Benefit (Corporate Pension) in Japan, 7
JAPAN LAB. REV. 66, 73 (2010) (making the analogous argument for Japan). Empirical
evidence shows that shareholders effectively pick up the tab, and that corporate
equity risk reflects the riskiness of the assets held by a firm’s pension plan. See Li Jin,
Robert C. Merton, & Zvi Bodie, Do a firm’s equity returns reflect the risk of its pension
plan?, 81 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2006).
177
Kashiwazaki & Fukazawa, supra note 176, at 73–74. Note that pension plan
underfunding undercuts diversification because employees again depend on the
employer. See Ippolito, supra note 127, at 1259 (arguing that the underfunding of
pension plans discourages unions from engaging in holdup to the detriment of
shareholders); Ippolito, supra note 112, at 611.
178
PETER F. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION 94–95 (1976).
179
Id. at 96–97; Markus Roth, German Private Pension Law, in IMAGINING THE IDEAL
PENSION SYSTEM 131, 143 (Dana M. Muir & John A. Turner eds., 2011).
180
Arthur R. Pinto, The United States, in PUBLIC COMPANIES AND THE ROLE OF
SHAREHOLDERS 13, 22–23 (Sabrina Bruno & Eugenio Ruggiero eds., 2011).
181
MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 68–69.
182
E.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullianathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life?
Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043, 1066–67 (2003)
(suggesting that managers prefer a “quiet life” not involving confrontation with
labor).
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often leads to changes to corporate objectives, product lines,
factories, and thus conditions of work and maybe the downsizing of
the workforce. Labor, therefore, typically prefers strong takeover
defenses. Shareholders may want managers to defend against hostile
takeovers to the extent that this drives up the price paid by the
183
bidder, but they will want a takeover to go forward once managers
184
have bargained for a good price with the bidder.
The shift in the private pension system has thus influenced the
effects of different policies on employees. An employee saving for
retirement in a DB plan firm needs to care little about how corporate
law policies affect share values generally, and the value of her
employer specifically. Her two objectives—protecting her human
capital and her pension wealth—can be achieved by largely the same
means, namely by staying in the firm and hoping for a favorable
working environment and workplace conditions, for promotion
opportunities within the firm, and for the firm’s continued operation
of the pension plan. The capital market is only important when an
employer loses its ability to fund the plan. Even if employees have no
firm-specific human capital investment, in a traditional DB plan they
have specific financial capital as de facto bondholders of their firm
and are thus subject to a possible holdup threat. Pro-shareholder
policies that create pressure to cut costs and downsize may not only
threaten their human capital, but also their financial capital if the
end result is a reduction of pension benefits, or even the ultimate
185
termination of a DB plan following an LBO.
Pension wealth,
therefore, will generate little, if any, worker preferences for pro186
shareholder policies at the expense of labor in DB plans. Workers
183

In the debates about Delaware takeover law, managers at least claim that
bidders offer an inadequate price because the stock market does not fully reflect the
value and the potential of the firm, and that shareholders are likely to be duped into
a accepting an inadequate offer. See, e.g., Allen, Jacobs, & Strine, supra note 52, at
1091 (“The first argument is that stockholders with diversified portfolios will be
better served if informed directors are permitted to block business combinations that
they believe in good faith are ill-advised.”).
184
This is the rationale for so-called Revlon duties, according to which the board
of directors is required to maximize price once a sale of the company has become
inevitable. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986).
185
For a discussion of opportunistic terminations, see supra Part III.B.4.
186
Peter Drucker coined the term “pension fund socialism” in a 1976 book and
argued that employees already owned American business through DB plans. But he
acknowledged that, psychologically, employees neither knew that they were owners
nor perceived or experienced ownership. DRUCKER, supra note 178, at 97. The
reason is that employees in DB plans are better characterized as creditors than as
owners. See also Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on
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will strongly prefer policies that result in a stable labor environment
and will disfavor pro-shareholder policies that are antagonistic to that
result. While they may care about the governance and efficiency of
the firm to the extent needed to achieve these goals, they will likely
disfavor risk-taking because of their large idiosyncratic risk in the
firm.
In a DC plan, pro-shareholder policies will have a direct impact
on employee wealth that may change whether a particular policy is
beneficial or detrimental to employees. For example, a proposed
policy that facilitates hostile takeovers may reduce the value of
human capital, while at the same time increase the value of pension
wealth. That does not imply that workers no longer need to care
about their jobs. Even if there is no specific human capital, workers
bear a “switching cost” and often have to accept less well-paying jobs.
On the margin, however, the closer connection between share value
and pension wealth in DC plans implies that the benefits of proshareholder corporate policies are greater than in DB plans, thus
making these relatively more advantageous compared to pro-labor
187
policies.
E. Shareholder Primacy and Social Welfare
Weighing the pro-shareholder and pro-labor policy objectives
against each other, an overall social welfare analysis will most likely
come to a different conclusion in the corporate DB world of the
1970s, as compared to the DC world of today. In a hypothetical
society where nine out of ten employees are subject to a DB plan and
one is subject to a DC plan, the larger number of workers is more
likely to benefit from pro-labor policies that generally protect human
capital, as opposed to pro-shareholder policies that benefit DC
pension wealth and have little impact on DB pension wealth. If the
numbers are reversed, a redistributive policy change that benefits
shareholders at the expense of employees may hurt human capital to
some extent, but for many employees, this will be outweighed by
benefits to DC pension wealth, while the impact on DB pension
wealth will be smaller.
A well-meaning social planner would therefore very likely favor a
different corporate law policy. Leaving other possible effects of the
Investment Management Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561, 567–68 (1981) (predicting a
growing influence of pension fund administrators).
187
While an ESOP would seem to make workers prefer less risky corporate
decisions given their non-diversified portfolio, a generous takeover premium might
sometimes help to overcome worker resistance.

GELTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

PENSIONS & SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY

5/28/2013 1:25 PM

947

change aside, the optimal point in a shareholder-labor scale will shift
closer to full shareholder primacy in a world where DC plans
dominate. The shift to greater shareholder primacy since the 1970s
may reflect the fact that the effects of pro-shareholder policies on
188
employees have become relatively more beneficial.
The analysis so far has assumed that the extent of human capital
investment has remained constant and that it is also unchanged in its
degree of specificity, the conclusion being that it is desirable for the
balance to shift to some extent in favor of investor interests. But to
optimize policy choices, one would need to determine the relative
significance of firm-specific human capital and pension wealth.
Margaret Blair estimates that the value of specific human capital is
189
typically several times as large as pension wealth.
Apart from that, the transformation of pension wealth may have
affected incentives to invest in specific human capital. The growth of
DC plans coincided and maybe was partly a consequence of the
decline of “large hierarchic firms and unionized industries,” and the
simultaneous growth of “high-tech firms and small, non-unionized
190
companies.” Relatedly, labor mobility began to increase in the late
191
1960s.
Thus, firm-specific human capital may have become less
important in the U.S. economy during the past decades.
The increase in labor mobility, which was influenced by a variety
of economic, social, and technological factors, started earlier than
the change in the pension system. Industries preferring DB plans
192
likely declined for other reasons, while other industries prospered.
Traditional DB plans, however, were suited to industries with a stable
workforce and not those in which workers tend to switch jobs

188

Changes in the pension system may have contributed to the popularity of
shareholder primacy in academia. As a business school professor put it at a
conference on shareholder primacy: “The closer I get to retirement, the more I like
shareholder wealth maximization.” This tongue-in-cheek remark reflects that with
increasing age, human capital (understood as net present value of future earnings)
decreases, while pension wealth (net present value of pensions) increases.
189
Blair, supra note 125, at 1310.
190
Munnell, supra note 60, at 367; see also Gustman & Steinmeier, supra note 119.
191
E.g., Gueorgui Kambourov & Iourii Manovskii, Rising Occupational and Industry
Mobility in the United States: 1968–1997, 49 INT’L ECON. REV 41 (2008) (describing an
increase in mobility both between jobs and between different industries).
192
Different levels of investment in human capital may be optimal in different
industries, and it may even be possible to organize work in ways that require different
levels of firm-specific human capital within a specific industry. See, e.g., MARGARET M.
BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 263–66 (1995) (discussing differences in worker mobility and
wage premia for incumbents between industries).
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193

frequently in the course of their careers.
Since ERISA made it
more difficult to inhibit mobility, it may have made the former
industries relatively less competitive. Thus, it probably accelerated
the trend toward more mobility, less firm-specific human capital, and
194
possibly more general or industry-specific human capital.
The
regulatory changes of the 1970s further helped the transformation of
the American economy.
Note that the point on social welfare is one of relative efficiency
of shareholder orientation given specific circumstances. The overall
effects of the change are more complex and probably indeterminate:
on the one hand, the reduction of firm-specific investment may have
hurt the American economy, and DC plans may harm workers by
burdening them with investment risk they are not well suited to bear.
DC funds are also sometimes thought to have a shorter time horizon
than DB funds and may therefore make it harder for firms to pursue
195
long-term projects. On the other hand, the shift to DC plans may
also have reduced employee resistance against innovation and
changes in the work environment. Larger financial markets may have
encouraged economic growth.
V. THE CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
This Part explores the consequences for the interest group
politics of corporate governance. Parts V.A and V.B consider the
general political environment and suggest that changes in the
pension system helped to align the interests of workers with those of
shareholders, thus leading to the rise of the “transparency coalition”
identified by political scientists. Parts V.C, V.D, and V.E provide an
illustration of this seismic shift in the politics of corporate governance
by looking at the rise of shareholder activism during the same period.
A significant contribution to shareholder activism came from unions,
which embraced the newly found “capitalist” interest of workers as
equity investors, and thus began to promote shareholder wealth
maximization as one of their policy objectives. The shift from DB to
DC plans was very likely not the only factor; indeed, some of the most
important shareholder activists are public pension plans operating
193

Munnell, supra note 60, at 367.
See Jacoby, supra note 19, at 286 (suggesting that firms no longer invest in
long-term projects such as employee training due to the short-term horizon of
institutional investors).
195
E.g., Michel Goyer, Capital Mobility, Varieties of Institutional Investors, and the
Transforming Stability of Corporate Governance in France and Germany, in BEYOND
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 195, 203 (Bob Hancké, Martin Rhodes, & Mark Thatcher
eds., 2007).
194
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under a DB system, who also became more strongly involved in equity
markets due to regulatory changes. The objective is to show that the
implementation of pro-shareholder reforms is partly the unintended
consequence of changes in the pension sector that made the
proposition of shareholder primacy more attractive.
A. Shareholders and the Center-Left
The increased importance of pension wealth for the welfare and
security of individuals also had an impact on the politics of corporate
governance. With the middle class increasingly depending on
pension savings, shareholders have become an important political
196
constituency.
Shareholders are sometimes even thought of “as a
197
proxy for the median voter.” Consequently, the political center-left
has championed the cause of shareholders, since an antimanagement agenda resonates with members of the middle class,
198
who are often both shareholders and employees.
Pro-shareholder
reforms of the past twenty years tended to be endorsed by the
Democratic Party and opposed by the Republicans, who were often in
199
favor of reforms that sought to cabin allegedly excessive litigation.
This is most clear in the context of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, which reacted to the corporate
200
governance crises of Enron and the Great Recession respectively :
democrats supported reforms that provided stronger securities
regulation, “Say on Pay” and “Proxy Access,” whereas Republicans,
alongside lobbyists such as the Business Roundtable and the
Chamber of Commerce, generally aligned themselves with critics who
argued that overregulation was liable to stifle the economy. Some of
the initiatives that led to the most recent reforms, such as the 2009
proposal for a Shareholder Bill of Rights Act, clearly established a
connection between corporate governance failures and “losses that
have been borne by millions of Americans who are shareholders
through their pension plans, 401(k) plans, and direct
196

Davis, supra note 14, at 1129 (suggesting the increasing political importance of
shareholder value due to the increase in the number of households invested in the
stock market from 20% in 1983 to 50% in 2001).
197
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 81, 139 (2011).
198
Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J.
CORP. L. 309, 338 (2011).
199
See John W. Cioffi & Martin Höpner, The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism:
Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform, 34 POL.
& SOC’Y 463, 480–84 (2006).
200
JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER 108–36 (2010).
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201

investments[.]” One of the most telling examples in which the proshareholders forces were not successful is the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which was intended to curtail
securities litigation and was enacted by a Republican Congress over
202
President Clinton’s veto.
B. The “Transparency Coalition” and Its Effects
The major corporate governance reforms of the last two decades
have primarily affected securities law and have sought to make
management more transparent and more accountable to the
investing public. The dividing line on these policy issues tended to
run between management and all other groups in corporate
governance. In situations like this, it is comparatively easy for what
Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn have christened the “transparency
coalition” to dominate corporate law policymaking. In such a
situation, managers have to yield to the demands of investors and
workers on the political level, both of whom benefit from
203
transparency.
Not all corporate governance issues lend themselves to a
shareholder-worker coalition, however. In contrast to the shared
interest in transparency, employees may be more skeptical about
increasing the actual decision-making power of shareholders,
particularly in decisions with redistributive effects between capital
and labor. Some hostile takeovers likely entailed such conflicts. In
Delaware, where takeover law took shape in the case law in the 1980s
and early 1990s, managers retained their preeminence as the leading
interest group to shape the law on takeover defenses, without having
to enter into coalitions. In most cases, managers of companies
threatened by hostile takeovers were the prime sponsors of anti-

201

Shareholder Bill of Rights Act, S.1074, 111th Cong. § 2(3) (2009); see also
Bruner, supra note 198, at 337–38 (citing from the bill and describing the Obama
administration’s agenda to help the middle class).
202
CIOFFI, supra note 200, at 105–07. It is certainly not a new development for the
Democratic Party to side with investors against managers. As John W. Cioffi and
Martin Höpner point out, “the New Deal of the 1930s created modern securities
regulation.” Cioffi & Höpner, supra note 199, at 484. Adolf Berle advocated
shareholder primacy and was an advisor to President Roosevelt. William W. Bratton
& Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the
Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 114–18 (2008). William W. Bratton and
Michael L. Wachter document that Berle’s erstwhile opponent E. Merrick Dodd
associated himself with representatives of managers who saw planning by the
managerial elite as the way out of the incipient Great Depression. Id. at 123–24.
203
GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 22, at 210–11.
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204

takeover statutes, but they often received passive or active support
205
In some cases, legislation supported solely by
from unions.
managers would have been unlikely to pass without the endorsement
206
of a traditional Democratic constituency such as labor.
Takeovers, however, are no longer as politically salient as they
were in the 1980s. During that period, DC plans had only begun to
supplant DB plans; thus, political decisions on state takeover law
might actually come out differently in today’s environment. The
corporate governance reforms and reform projects of the past two
decades were intended to make managers more accountable to
shareholders. Putting independent directors in charge of the board’s
207
208
audit committee,
strengthening auditor independence,
209
strengthening shareholder voice in director appointments, and “Say
210
would at first glance not seem to have colorable
on Pay”
detrimental consequences for employees.
But it is sometimes thought that in the managerial model of the
1950s, employees tacitly or explicitly formed coalitions with
211
management to the detriment of outside shareholders; in this view,
management agreed to generous deals regarding wages and benefits
for employees, while unions would not object to “sweet deals” or
private benefits of control for top management. Obviously, reforms
increasing transparency and strengthening shareholder voice may be
making this kind of deal more difficult. Conceivably, in a stakeholder
model of corporate governance, corporate opacity might make it
204

See William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715,
749–51 (1998) (listing corporate sponsors of statutes).
205
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on
Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 435, 437 n.8 (1988); Eric W.
Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 14, 24–25 (1992); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 10, 63–64 (1991); Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes:
Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 96 (1999).
206
See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of
the States, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 491, 496–97 (1988).
207
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 301, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 775 (2002).
208
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Title II, 116 Stat. at 771–75.
209
Regarding the SEC’s efforts to expand “shareholder access” to the company’s
proxy statement, see supra note 21.
210
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 951, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (introducing a new Securities Exchange Act
§ 14A, which requires shareholder votes on executive compensation). On the
preceding discussion, see, Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K.
Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-in, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323 (2009).
211
E.g., Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the American Corporate Governance
Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97, 101 (2000); GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note
22, at 237–38; GOMEZ & KORINE, supra note 14, at 99–135.
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easier to engage in long-run deals with labor that would be assessed
very critically under the short-term pressures emanating from the
212
In a less transparent corporate world where
capital markets.
managers are less exposed to pressures from the capital markets, it
may be easier to implement pension plans, whose conceivable
213
benefits for human capital are hard to assess for the financial
214
market.
The bottom line is that changes in corporate governance
that result in increased transparency could be a factor associated with
both the shift toward DC plans and the increasing dominance of
shareholder over labor interests.
C. The Rise of Institutional Investors
The changes in the private pension landscape have also had the
effect of channeling the political power of shareholder value through
215
the pension system, thus increasing the significance of the financial
industry, both on the level of individual firms where pension wealth is
invested and on the political level. Due to institutional constraints,
the effects on the politics are more nuanced than one might expect.
There are several models of how pension wealth is managed.
Their structure is determined by the Taft-Hartley Act, which allows
employer-provided pension plans to have at most 50% union
216
representatives on their board of trustees. Thus, pension plans are
212

Institutional investors in general and pension funds in particular are often
criticized for their short-term orientation. E.g., Jacoby, supra note 19, at 285.
Relatedly, the argument that hostile takeovers maximize shareholder wealth rests on
the assumption that market values reflect long-term firm value with reasonable
accuracy. See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 674 (2007) (“academic endorsement of . . . short-term
stock price . . . may reinforce inappropriate managerial decisions); Michael L.
Wachter, Takeover Defenses When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively Efficient, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 787, 819–23 (2003).
213
See supra Parts III.B.3, IV.B, and IV.C.
214
Furthermore, with the rise of the DC paradigm, DB pension plans are
becoming less familiar to shareholders, to whom they may appear as an unjustified
privilege of unionized workers. Compare the debate about pension benefits of
public employees. Move Public Employees Into 401(k)s?: Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/02/27/why-not401ks-for-public-employees.
215
Tom Hadden, Corporate Governance by Institutional Investors? Some Problems from
the International Perspective, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
89, 94 (Theodor Baums, Richard M. Buxbaum, & Klaus J. Hopt eds., 1993) (stating
that pension fund managers are only interested in shareholder wealth).
216
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 prohibits employers from making payments to
unions, including union-run pension funds, except plans with equal representation
of employees and employers (i.e., unions and managers) on the board. Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5). The
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controlled either by corporate managers or under shared control by
employers and unions. Employer-pension plans obviously do not
217
Plans under
appear as separate actors in corporate governance.
shared management—so-called Taft-Hartley plans—are usually multiemployer plans and therefore dominated by unions, which are
independent corporate governance players. By contrast, 401(k)
assets are typically invested in mutual funds.
Consider the Conference Board’s data on equity ownership in
218
the United States :
Figure 5: Investment in equities (billions of $)
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Act was part of the backlash to the New Deal, when managers feared increased union
influence and induced Congress to pass the Act prohibiting payments to plans that
were fully controlled by unions, which unions might have used to fund strikes or
activity directing against employers. See Mark J. Roe, The Modern Corporation and
Private Pensions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 75, 84–85 (1993) (discussing interest groups in the
legislative process); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate
Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1075–77 (1998)
(describing the origin, structure, and prevalence of Taft-Hartley Plans); Murphy,
supra note 108, at 531–32. ERISA applies to both corporate pension plans and TaftHartley plans, which are often multi-employer plans and are typically dominated by
unions. See Marleen O’Connor, Organized Labor as Shareholder Activist: Building
Coalitions to Promote Worker Welfare, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1345, 1357 (1997). Pension
plans directly controlled by employers do not engage in shareholder activism. Roe,
supra, note 215, at 109.
217
Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 596–98
(1990); Roe, supra note 216, at 109 (“ERISA rules and pension structure help protect
managers form intrusive shareholders”); Murphy, supra note 108, at 525–29.
218
MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHAN RABIMOV, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE 2010
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO
COMPOSITION 25–26 (2010).
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Figure 5 illustrates the growth of institutional investment from 1980
through 2009. Total institutional investment increased from $436.2
billion in 1980 to $13,473 billion in 2007, just before the financial
crisis. These figures of course do not only include vehicles for
219
pension wealth, and not all investment company assets are pension
assets (although a large part is).
60%

Figure 6: Institutional share of equity investment
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220

Figure 6 shows that the share of institutional investors in equity
investment also increased relatively, namely from less than 30% to
around 50%. Private and public pension funds initially grew from a
share of about 17% and 3% respectively (relative to total equity
investment). After 1990, private funds began to lose market share,
while public finds largely maintained theirs, with private funds
showing up with 14.7% in 2007 and public ones with 7.8% in the
same year. Meanwhile, investment companies’ share increased from
only 3.1% in 1980 to 22% in 2007. Overall, the total share of these
three types of investment vehicles grew from 23% to 42.5% of the
equities market.
D. Unions as Corporate Governance Activists
The newfound significance of capital markets for workers was of
course not lost on unions, which began to use their power for the
219

Insurance companies, savings institutions, and foundations are omitted from
Figures 5 and 6.
220
Data from TONELLO & RABIMOV, supra note 218 (obvious mathematical error
corrected by the author).
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benefit of their constituents. Unions no longer only engage in
classical industrial action, but have also become some of the most
221
visible shareholder activists, both through Taft-Hartley pension
222
plans and through their own holdings. Some unions, such as AFLCIO and the Teamsters, were parties in notable corporate law cases
relating to shareholder voting, some of which ostensibly had nothing
223
to do with labor issues.
Furthermore, in the early 1990s, unions
switched alliances with respect to takeovers: instead of siding with
224
managers to oppose them, they began to join forces with other
225
shareholders to obtain the highest return on their investment.
Unions have supported corporate governance legislation intended to
hold managers more accountable to shareholders, including
226
227
Sarbanes-Oxley and shareholder proxy access.
They generally
support pro-shareholder institutions such as the Council of
Institutional Investors and the International Corporate Governance
228
Network.
221

E.g., Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the Shareholder Revolution, in WORKING
CAPITAL: THE POWER OF LABOR’S PENSIONS 67, 67 (Archon Fung, Tessa Hebb & Joel
Rogers eds., 2001). Shareholder activism is often part of a so-called “comprehensive
campaign,” in the course of which unions employ all available tactics against a firm,
including public relations and legislative initiatives. James J. Brudney, Collateral
Conflict: Employer Claims of RICO Extortion Against Union Comprehensive Campaigns, 83 S.
CAL. L. REV. 731, 738 (2010).
222
See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 216, at 1081 (pointing out that unions are
not subject to ERISA fiduciary duties with their own holdings).
223
E.g., Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); The Food and Allied Serv. Trade Dep’t v. WalMart, No. Civ. A. 12551, 1992 WL 111285 (Del. Ch. Ct. May 20, 1992) (seeking a
stock list to inform shareholders about the use of prison labor); Int’l Brotherhood of
Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Co., Inc., 975 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1999) (finding that
shareholders may propose and adopt a bylaw requiring the redemption of a poison
pill). See also AFSCME v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121 (2nd Cir. 2006) (public sector union
seeking bylaw amendment to allow shareholder proxy access); CA Inc. v. AFSCME
Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008) (public-sector union seeking a bylaw
amendment requiring the reimbursement of shareholders for expenses relating to
contested director elections).
224
E.g., Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor be Allowed to Make
Shareholder Proposals, 73 WASH. L. REV. 41, 47 (1998).
225
O’Connor, supra note 211, at 101, 109–10; see Thomas & Martin, supra note
224, at 48–51 (describing the historical development of union activism).
226
See Sanford M. Jacoby, Finance and Labor: Perspectives on Risk, Inequality, and
Democracy, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 17, 51–52 (2008) (describing the AFL-CIO’s
support for Sarbanes-Oxley).
227
See id. at 55–56 (discussing union support for shareholder proxy access);
Sanford M. Jacoby, The Future of Labor and Finance, 30 COMP LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 111, 116
(2008).
228
Brishen Rogers, The Complexities of Shareholder Primacy: A Response to Sanford
Jacoby, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 95, 98–99 (2008).
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Part of this may be attributable to highly contextualized
decisions to engage in shareholder activism and the fragmented
character of the American labor movement: unions have little reason
to care about workers in other firms who are not their members. A
single national union might have reacted differently. Nevertheless, it
seems paradoxical for unions, whose purpose is to represent
employees, to support hostile takeovers and other business measures
229
that may entail downsizing and job cuts. Their changed focus looks
justified, however, when one realizes that unions have been operating
under very different circumstances in recent decades: membership
230
decreased dramatically during the 1980s.
While unions certainly
continued to have an interest in preserving jobs in order to maintain
their membership, because of aging cohorts of workers retiring, a
larger percentage of their constituents were pensioners.
Consequently, obtaining a good return on their investments for aging
231
members became relatively more important.
In addition, ERISA
may also have played a role in instigating union shareholder activism,
given that the pension plan’s board members were subject to the
232
statute’s fiduciary duty.
The view of unions as true shareholder activists has of course
been challenged. In the popular press, it has sometimes been
suggested that unions use their influence as shareholders to advance
233
a general political agenda.
In the more nuanced academic
229

Simon Deakin, The Rise of Finance: What Is It, What Is Driving It, What Might Stop
It?, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 67, 71 (2008); see also Teresa Ghilarducci, Solving the
Paradox of Workers as Shareholders: A Comment on Sanford Jacoby, 30 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 85, 88 (2008) (ironically suggesting that unions are funding their “class
enemies”).
230
O’Connor, supra note 211, at 101; O’Connor, supra note 216, at 1379;
Wachter, supra note 118, at 582, 634 (plotting the percentage of union workers 1930–
2005); Murphy, supra note 108, at 532 (describing a decline in union membership
from 30% to 9% between the 1950s and 2000). Takeovers in which unionized
employees were laid off seem to have been one of the reasons. Thomas & Martin,
supra note 224, at 41, 47–48.
231
See Thomas & Martin, supra note 224, at 49 (describing the new-found union
opposition to takeover defenses); Teresa Ghilarducci, James Hawley & Andrew
William, Labour’s Paradoxical Interest and the Evolution of Corporate Governance, 24 J. L. &
SOC’Y 26, 34 (1997). The success of “comprehensive campaigns” by unions that
include shareholder activism has apparently also contributed to growth in union
membership since 2005, particularly in the services industries. Brudney, supra note
221, at 742.
232
Schwab & Thomas, supra note 216, at 1077–78; O’Connor, supra note 211, at
129–30; see also Rogers, supra note 228, at 107 (suggesting that the ERISA trustee duty
would weigh against union use of shareholder activism for other ends than wealth
maximization).
233
E.g., Pension Fund Blackmail, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2005, at A10 (accusing the
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discussion, critics such as Reinier Kraakman suggested that unions
are likely to prioritize workers’ interests over shareholder wealth,
given that the former are tied up in a specific firm. Thus, labor can
capture rents in the guise of wages; by contrast, the pension
investment in shares is spread out over a diversified portfolio and
234
thus hard to influence through activism. But an empirical study by
Schwab and Thomas found that union activism more often than not
235
works in favor of shareholder wealth.
While the anecdotal and
empirical picture is certainly ambiguous, both public and private
sector unions have initiated and supported measures that are
generally thought to be in the interest of shareholders. These
include pro-takeover initiatives such as pill-redemption bylaws,
236
staggered boards, and bylaw amendments relating to shareholder
voting, such as the contested issue of majority voting instead of
237
There were also some
plurality voting in elections for directors.
widely publicized cases where unions pushed “corporate social
AFL-CIO of influencing managers to oppose private social security accounts).
234
Reinier Kraakman, The Mystery of Union Shareholder Activism: Commentary on
Schwab and Thomas, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING WORKPLACE:
ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 431, 433–34 (Samuel
Estreicher ed., 1998). To protect workers from excessive risk, diversification is
mandated by section 404 of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C)), which may inhibit
private pension fund activism. See Murphy, supra note 108, at 506–07.
235
Schwab & Thomas, supra note 216, at 1090 (summarizing their finding that
unions have become “sophisticated players in corporate-governance battles,” where
the “battles emphasize efficiency and firm value”); see also GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra
note 22, at 251 (identifying “an emerging tendency for workers to make common
cause with shareholders”); see also Murphy, supra note 108, at 539.
236
E.g., UNITE v. May Dept. Stores Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Int’l
Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., 975 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1999); see Schwab
& Thomas, supra note 216, at 1045 (“The most frequent proposals in the 1995 and
1996 proxy seasons were those to redeem or vote on poison pills and to repeal
classified boards . . . .”).
237
See, e.g., SEC No-action letter to Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc. (Mar. 30, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2011/unite
here033011-14a8.pdf (addressing UNITE’s 14a-8 majority voting proposal); SEC Noaction letter to NRG Energy, Incl. (Jan. 28, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2009/liuna012809-14a8
.pdf (discussing LIUNA’s majority vote proposal); SEC No-action letter to Suntrust
Banks (Jan. 13, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cfnoaction/14a-8/2010/unitedbrotherhood011510-14a-8.pdf (addressing the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters’s 14a-8 proposal); WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN
& GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 214–17 (3d ed. 2009) (example of pension fund using 14a- to
introduce majority voting); SEC No-action letter to Verizon Communications (Feb. 2,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2009
/ibew020209-14a8.pdf (discussing private sector union proposal to introduce
cumulative voting).
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238

responsibility” proposals or labor issues.
Still, even without a full
empirical assessment, it seems fair to say that union activism has to a
large degree helped the cause of shareholder primacy. As early as
1994, other shareholders trusted unions enough for the evidence to
239
show that union proposals received more votes than others. This is
a significant change compared to union activities a few decades
earlier.
E. Activism by Other Institutional Investors
One might object that union-sponsored plans have traditionally
been DB plans.
But union-sponsored plans are increasingly
becoming DC plans. Because the influence of share value on pension
wealth has increased, unions are more likely to support shareholder240
wealth-oriented proposals..
Generally, however, public pension
funds have been much more active shareholders, most notably the
241
biggest pension fund in the country, CalPERS. While government
employees typically enjoy DB plans, the fiduciary requirement and
the increased difficulty in securing state money to cover funding gaps
may have incited them to promote shareholder wealth. Before 1980,
very little public pension money was invested in equities because state
pension systems were typically not permitted to invest a large
242
proportion of their portfolio in shares. Until a 1984 amendment to
the California constitution, CalPERS could only invest up to 25% of
238

Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 54
F.3d 69 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995) (14a-8 proposal relating to Wal-Mart’s allegedly
discriminatory policies); see O’Connor, supra note 221, at 71–73; O’Connor, supra
note 211, at 113–15 (surveying union use of shareholder proposals in the context of
labor disputes or negotiations); see also United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Int’l
Paper Co., 1992, 801 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (union activism relating to
environmental policies); O’Connor, supra note 216, at 1363–66 (describing the
controversy about alleged employment discrimination at Cracker Barrel); Anabtawi,
supra note 21, at 590 (describing United Food Worker’s Union use of pension
holdings to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis Safeway).
239
Thomas & Martin, supra note 224, at 67–68; Schwab & Thomas, supra note
216, at 1052.
240
Schwab & Thomas, supra note 216, at 1040.
241
E.g., Sanford M. Jacoby, Convergence by Design: The Case of CalPERS in Japan, 55
AM. J. COMP. L. 239, 243–54 (2007) (describing the history of shareholder activism by
CalPERS); Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fish, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the
Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315,
315 (2008); Aaron Lucchetti & Joann S. Lublin, Corporate Governance: Calpers Targets
Directors Who Neglect Holders, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2004, at C1 (describing CalPERS’s
renewed efforts at shareholder activism); see also Westland Police & Fire Retirement
Sys. v. Axcelis Techs. Inc., 1 A.3d 281 (Del. 2010) (public sector pension plan seeking
to put a majority voting bylaw amendment on the target company’s proxy statement).
242
Jacoby, supra note 226, at 46.
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243

its portfolio in stocks. For similar regulatory reasons, many pension
244
funds had few or no equities in their portfolios until the mid-1990s.
The proponents of the Californian amendment argued that prudent
equity investment would create a higher yield and thus save taxpayers
245
money.
With regulation receding and equities increasingly
perceived as the highest-yielding class of investment, pension funds
246
across the country shifted into equities. In other words, the equitybased model penetrated the public sector because private pension
247
funds displayed better performance. Ultimately, the success of the
private DC model may therefore have contributed to changing
practices in the public sector.
Nevertheless, it is not surprising that state and local government
248
pension funds are among the most active institutional investors.
One reason may be that some of them are unusually large, and
249
another that they comprise about 40% of the pension sector.
Having to accommodate demographic challenges and funding gaps,
public pension funds largely embraced the idea of shareholder
250
primacy. Large pension funds are likely to be more active because
they have more predictable inflows and outflows, and because their
243

CAL. CONST. art. 16, § 17 (amended 1984); CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET,
Primary Election, June 5, 1984, Proposition 21 (proposition to amend the California
constitution to allow state pension plans to eliminate the 25% ceiling in order to
allow higher investment returns). CalPERS had been required to invest only in longterm bonds that matched its payment obligations, but was permitted to invest 25% of
its portfolio in stocks in 1967. See Bruce E. Aronson, A Japanese CalPERS or a New
Model for Institutional Investor Activism? Japan’s Pension Fund Association and the
Emergence of Shareholder Activism in Japan, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 571, 593 n.55 (2011).
The ceiling was eliminated in 1984. See id.
244
David Hess, Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Assets: Empirical Evidence on
the Effects of Governance Structures and Practices, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 187, 194 (2005).
In Minnesota and New York, public pension plans were permitted to invest in
equities in 1995 and 1996 respectively. Compare 1994 MINN. CHAPTER LAW 604,
§ 356A.06, subd. 7(f) (permitting investment into equities of up to 85% of plan
funds), with 1989 MINN. SESS. LAW SERV. 319, § 6, subd. 6(B) (not listing corporate
stock among permissible investment vehicles). 1996 SESS. LAW NEWS OF N.Y. CH. 712
(A. 11226). Compare NY RETIREMENT & SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (1996) § 177(2)
(permitting at most 2% of fund assets being invested in equities), with NY
RETIREMENT & SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (1997) § 177(2) (permitting 60%).
245
CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 243, at 26, 27.
246
CLARK, supra note 164, at 65 (explaining that equities became attractive in bull
markets).
247
Hess, supra note 244, at 194.
248
E.g., Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in
the United States, J. APP. CORP. FIN. , vol. 19, no. 1, at 55, 56–58 (2007) (discussing the
role of public pension funds).
249
Black, supra note 217, at 598–99; Anabtawi, supra note 21, at 588.
250
Jacoby, supra note 226, at 46.

GELTER (DO NOT DELETE)

960

5/28/2013 1:25 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:909

portfolios inevitably mirror the economy as a whole, thus eliminating
251
Like unions, they also have other controversial
the exit option.
political and social goals, given that they must appeal to their political
252
constituents. Generally, however, public pension funds look to the
“shareholder wealth bottom line” when acting as shareholder
253
activists. Taking into account that the public sector clients of public
pension plans never worked at the companies in which their
retirement savings were invested, it has apparently been easy for
public pension plans to favor shareholder interests over labor
interests; public pension fund activism has often led to layoffs and
254
divestitures.
The spread of 401(k) plans contributed to the enormous
expansion of the mutual fund industry, in which much of these
255
savings are invested.
Interestingly, mutual funds have embraced
shareholder activism comparatively late and have been described as
“relatively docile shareholders” because they rarely engage in
256
activism.
They have often been described as “vot[ing] with their
257
feet” by selling if they are discontent with management. Moreover,
some observers have criticized possible conflicts of interest of mutual
fund managers. Arguably, fund managers are sometimes inclined to
251

BLAIR, supra note 192, at 167–68.
Black, supra note 217, at 599–600 (pointing out that some public pension fund
managers have to face elections); see Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2491, 2524–25 (2005) (giving an account of CalPERS’ tendency to get involved in
labor disputes and CSR issues); Hess, supra note 244, at 206 (discussing criticism of
CalPERS’ activism).
253
See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 231, at 30 (reporting that CalPERS targeted
firms because of poor performance).
254
Jacoby, supra note 226, at 47 (quoting a CalPERS official commenting that
some firms may need to lay off more employees); see O’Connor, supra note 211, at
110 (describing criticism that pension fund managers are driving downsizing).
255
Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisors to
Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 848, 858 (2009); Murphy, supra note
108, at 544–45; see David J. Carter, Mutual Fund Boards and Shareholder Action, 3 VILL. J.
L. & INV. MGMT. 6, 19, 22 (2001) (summarizing data about 401(k) investment in
mutual funds); Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why not
disclose?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1426, 1428 (2002) (providing data about the
growth of the mutual fund industry).
256
Leo E. Strine, The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New
Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 687 (2005); see also Palmiter,
supra note 256, at 1430–31; Jacoby, supra note 226, at 55; Anne Tucker, The Citizen
Shareholder: Modernizing the Agency Paradigm to Reflect How and Why a Majority of
Americans Invest in the Market, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1299, 1302–07 (2012)
(highlighting agency problems between investors and mutual funds managers).
257
E.g., Daniel Gross, Some Mutual Funds Are Joining the Activist Bandwagon, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/15/business
/mutfund/15active.html (quoting an investment analyst).
252
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please corporate managers, who are in the position to direct
employees’ 401(k) wealth to investment companies that do not object
258
There is some
to the firm’s corporate governance practices.
evidence that business ties make mutual funds vote in a more
259
manager-friendly way, but the data are not entirely unambiguous.
Counterintuitively, Cremers and Romano found that even a 2003 SEC
rule requiring disclosure of voting decisions has led not to more proshareholder votes by mutual funds, but rather to an increased
support of executive compensation plans proposed by
260
management.
Scholars have advanced several explanations for the failure of
401(k) plans to produce the level of shareholder activism that would
seem optimal from the perspective of investors: first, mutual funds
261
make money through the fees they charge investors, and the funds
tend to be strongly diversified, so that benefits from shareholder

258

Palmiter, supra note 256, at 1432; Jacoby, supra note 226, at 55; Murphy, supra
note 108, at 560; see Black, supra note 217, at 602 (“(i) mutual funds often invest
401(k) and defined contribution pension plan funds for corporations, and thus face
some of the same pressures as other corporate pension fund managers”); Roger W.
Ferguson, Riding Herd on Company Management, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2010, at A15
(President of TIAA-CREF pointing out mutual funds managers’ possible conflicts of
interest).
259
Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds,
85 J. FIN. ECON. 552 (2007) (finding no relationship between business ties and voting
patterns on the firm level, but an aggregate propensity of mutual fund families with
more business ties to vote in favor of management); Taub, supra note 255, at 875–76
(finding that mutual funds were less likely to vote in favor of shareholder proposals
when the same mutual fund family also managed the company’s 401(k) plan). For
data on mutual fund proxy voting, see also Burton Rothberg & Steven Lilien, Mutual
Funds and Proxy Voting: New Evidence on Corporate Governance, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 157
(2006); Rasha Ashraf, Narayanan Jayaraman & Harley E. Ryan, Jr., Do Pension-Related
Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on
Executive Compensation, 47 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 567 (2012) (finding that funds with
pension-related business ties are more likely to vote in favor of managers, irrespective
of ties with the specific firm).
260
K.J. Martijn Cremers & Roberta Romano, Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting
on Compensation Plans: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Rules, 13
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 220 (2011); see Proxy Voting by Investment Companies, Securities
Act Release, No. 8188, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), ¶ 86826, at 87,142 (Jan. 31, 2003),
68 Fed. Reg. 6564-85 (requiring disclosure); Murphy, supra note 108, at 546; see
Aaron Lucchetti, Monthly Mutual Funds Review – Labor Puts Pressure on Funds – AFLCIO’s Trumka Discusses Why Unions Push for More Disclosure, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2003, at
R1 (discussing union support for disclosure of union votes); Jacoby, supra note 226,
at 55; Taub, supra note 255, at 864 (describing conflicts of interest at Deutsche Bank
resulting from its investment bank advising a takeover), and 868–69 (discussing
Fidelity’s vote at Intel in light of it managing Intel’s 401(k) plan).
261
Strine, supra note 256, at 687.
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activism on the firm level are captured by other shareholders.
Second, mutual funds also tend to focus on short-term investments,
263
which is typically not compatible with shareholder activism.
Nevertheless, at least some mutual funds have become more active in
recent years, pushing for shareholder wealth alongside other
264
institutional investors. Mutual funds have also generally supported
proposals, such as proxy access, to strengthen the role of
265
shareholders in corporate governance.
The purpose of this Article is not to comprehensively explain
shareholder activism and proxy voting by institutional investors that
seek to bring managers more in line with shareholder concerns.
Overall, there are considerable limitations to shareholder activism by
any type of institutional investor, such as diversification and the lack
of staff to take a deeply engaged role in systematic corporate
266
governance research.
The enthusiasm about institutional investor
activism expressed by shareholder primacists certainly faded in the
267
In recent years, other factors have pushed
late 1990s and 2000s.
firms more strongly to cater to the interests of shareholders,
including the influence of proxy advisors, particularly Institutional
Shareholder Services, on the voting decisions of financial
268
269
institutions, activism by hedge funds taking larger stakes in firms.
The growth of the pension sector played a role for the development
of the latter as well, since a sizeable proportion of hedge fund capital
270
is today provided by pension funds.
262

Id. at 687.
Palmiter, supra note 255, at 1431.
264
Id. at 1435–40; Gross, supra note 257; Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled
CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1001 (2010); see Black, supra note 217, at 602 (describing
Fidelity’s transient opposition to an antitakeover statute in 1990); Gretchen
Morgenson, Belated Apologies in Proxy Land, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/20/business/yourmoney/20gret.html
(describing Putnam Funds attempt to influence firms); see also Iman Anabtawi &
Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1276 (2008)
(discussing mutual fund activism by Fidelity and Vanguard).
265
E.g., Letter from Barbara Krumsiek of Calvert Group Ltd. to Securities and
Exchange Commission (July 23, 2007) available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4537/4537-79.pdf (supporting SEC proposal on proxy access).
266
E.g., Coffee, supra note 33, at 1975 (pointing out the limitations of even
CalPERS’ possibilities).
267
Id. at 1981–83 (discussing possible reasons).
268
James Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and
Mutual Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2010).
269
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007).
270
THECITYUK, HEDGE FUNDS 2013, at 4, chart 10, available at
http://www.thecityuk.com/research/our-work/reports-list/hedge-funds-2012
263
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The point of this section and the preceding ones is not been to
suggest that the shift from DB to DC plans has encouraged
shareholder activism; to the contrary, there might be less of it in the
future as more workers are shifted into DC plans. The argument has
been that labor-oriented institutions such as unions and pension
funds have increasingly accepted the objective of shareholder wealth
maximization as important for their constituencies. It may well be
that shareholder activism is a relatively insignificant for managers;
mutual funds’ practice of selling shares of firms with whose
performance they are dissatisfied may well be considerably more
important for creating pressure on firms to maintain a high share
price (and possibly to focus on short-term gains). Mutual fund
managers have good reasons to care about the performance of the
stock in their portfolio, but not about how firms treat their
employees; this holds true even if they manage the same employees’
pension wealth, since fund managers are institutionally completely
separated from workers. While pension savings and the increase in
the institutional character of share ownership have certainly
encouraged shareholder activism and the implementation of reforms
in line with the shareholder primacy vision, actual pressures to
maximize share price might well increase as DB investment continues
to be replaced by DC investment.
VI. PENSIONS AND SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY ABROAD
A quick look at other developed economies, particularly
continental European countries and Japan, confirms the thesis that
the shift from DB to DC plans is linked to the move from managerial
to shareholder capitalism in the United States. Both in terms of their
corporate governance and pension systems, these countries look
more—but not entirely—like the United States did before the
changes described in Parts II to V.
With respect to corporate governance, it is often claimed that in
countries outside the common law world, shareholders are not very
well protected, share ownership is concentrated, and capital markets
271
More importantly for this Article,
are comparatively small.
(showing pension funds as the source of 22% of hedge fund assets in 2012, up from
15% in 2004).
271
The reasons are highly disputed. Based on cross-sectional empirical studies, it
is often argued that the civil law tradition is less amenable to investor protection than
the common law. Rafeal La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The
Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008). According to the
contrary view, left-wing politics inhibited the development of pro-shareholder
institutions in Continental Europe. Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern
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continental Europe and Japan are usually thought to be
characterized by models that give precedence to other constituencies
272
over shareholders. Germany, alongside a number of other Central
and Northern European countries, stands out by giving employees
representation on the board of directors, and thus at least some
273
influence on corporate matters.
Japanese firms have long been
known for strong pro-worker orientation, in particular a “lifetime
274
employment” relationship with employees.
In combination with
275
strong cross-ownership structures within the so-called “keiretsu,”
Japanese firms can probably even be called labor-dominated. But
even in jurisdictions with little or no employee participation in
boardroom decision-making such as France and Italy, the extensive
powers of controlling shareholders are balanced by strong labor laws
that are considerably more strongly weighed in favor of employees
276
than in the United States.
While there are of course many differences among the various
Continental European pension systems as well as between the
European and Japanese systems, there are two comparative patterns.
First, government-funded Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) pensions systems
play a greater role for retirees, at least in Continental Europe, than
Social Security does in the United States. While data from different
countries are often directly comparable, the OECD figures on the
sources of retirement income of those over 65 are probably most

Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460, 502–16 (2006).
272
E.g., Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of “Germany Inc.”: The Case of Executive
Pay, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497, 500–01 (2001); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at
443–49; Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and
Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 733 (2004); Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation
on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic
Integration in Europe, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 208–09 (1994).
273
See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance
Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163, 168 (Margaret M. Blair &
Mark J. Roe eds., 1999); Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The
Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constituencies, in
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 89, 100–01 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed.
2009).
274
E.g., Caslav Pejovic, Japanese Corporate Governance: Behind Legal Norms, 29 PENN.
ST. INT’L L. REV. 483, 492–95 (2011).
275
A keiretsu is a set of companies characterized by a common main bank,
interlocking directorships and cross-ownership between the firms belonging to it.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J, Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps
Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 872–73,
882–84 (1993).
276
See, e.g., Gelter, supra note 47, at 171–73 (discussing employment law in
Continental Europe).
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Table 3. Sources of income for those 65 and older

France
Germany
Italy
Japan
United Kingdom
United States

Public transfers

Work

Capital

85.44%
73.07%
72.20%
48.34%
49.36%
36.13%

6.50%
12.09%
23.80%
44.29%
12.09%
34.20%

8.07%
14.84%
4.00%
7.37%
38.55%
29.67%

In the Continental European jurisdictions, public transfers (i.e.
public pensions) dominate. The United Kingdom resembles the
United States more closely, except that less income is derived from
work above sixty-five. Japan similarly stands out because of its high
percentage of income derived from work, which is likely due to the
generous company pensions provided by large Japanese firms.
Nevertheless, the low significance of income based on capital is
striking. Only looking at the ratio between public transfer and
capital in each country would show that the relative importance of
public and private pensions is similar to Continental Europe.
Like Social Security, PAYGO systems abroad take the form of a
DB plan underwritten by the government: employees and employers
pay contributions to a government entity, which uses these funds to
pay current retirees. The amount of the pension normally depends
on the number of years worked, contributions made, and the age of
278
retirement.
277

OECD, PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 60 (2009). The data (for a larger set of
countries) are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/635426478286. Similar data
for a small set of countries are also available for 1978–1980 at OECD, REFORMING
PUBLIC PENSIONS, OECD SOCIAL POLICY STUDIES NO. 5, 55 (1988).
278
Lothar Schruff, Pensions and Post-Retirement Benefits by Employers in Germany, 64
BROOK. L. REV. 795, 795 (1998); Bert Rürup, The German Pension System: Status Quo and
Reform Options, in SOCIAL SECURITY PENSION REFORM IN EUROPE 137, 139–43 (Martin
Feldstein & Horst Siebert eds., 2002); Kathryn L. Moore, Lessons from the French
Funding Debate, 65 OHIO ST. L. J. 5, 9, 13 (2004) (describing the DB formula for
French public pensions); Charles Yuji Horioka, Japan’s Public Pension System in the
Twenty-First Century, in JAPAN’S NEW ECONOMY 99, 99–101 (Magnus Blomström, Byron
Gangnes & Sumner La Croix eds., 2001) (Japan); see also Friedrich K. Kübler,
Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A German Dilemma, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 97,
100 (1991) (reporting that in 1991, a German pension of a typical retiree
corresponded to 70% of the last salary).
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Second, private pensions in Continental Europe and Japan tend
to be of the DB variety more often than in the United States or the
279
United Kingdom, with domestic pension funds long remaining
280
limited in significance.
Both German and Japanese company
pensions are traditionally “book reserve” plans, in which the firm
commits to paying a specified pension in the future without setting
281
up a trust fund.
In 1996, about 56% of German employment282
In France, employers’
related pension claims took this form.
organizations and labor unions jointly set up a national DB pension
283
plan in the years after World War II.
The United Kingdom is an exception to the European pattern.
Its corporate governance system has long been characterized by
shareholder-centrism and differed both from the managerialism in
the United States and the labor models of Continental Europe and
284
Japan.
Like the U.S. pension system, the U.K. system is
characterized by a low level of state pensions and a high level of
285
As in the United States, pension reforms during
private pensions.
279

E.g., Gordon L. Clark, Pension Systems: A Comparative Perspective 7 (2000),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=228948.
280
E.g., Kübler, supra note 278, at 99 (“Pension funds so far have had very little
importance.”).
281
Charny, supra note 57, at 1641; Stefan Prigge, A Survey of German Corporate
Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE—THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING
RESEARCH 943, 1019 (Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy Wymeersch &
Stefan Prigge eds., 1998); MACKENZIE, supra note 139, at 227–28 (all discussing
Germany); David Rajnes, The Evolution of Japanese Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plans,
67 SOC. SEC. BUL. 89, 91, 93 (2007) (discussing Japan); Robert L. Clark, Japanese
Pension Plans in Transition, BENEFITS Q., First Quarter 1996, at 59 (discussing DB
payouts to retirees in Japan).
282
Schruff, supra note 278, at 804; see also Ahrend, supra note 281, at 86
(providing the 1991 data).
283
Lucy apRoberts, Comments, in SECURING EMPLOYER-BASED PENSIONS 105, 109–10
(Zvi Bodie, Olivia S. Mitchell & John A. Turner eds., 1996).
284
E.g., BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH
BUSINESS TRANSFORMED 30 (2008) (pointing out that in UK companies, shareholders
can recall the board); Bruner, supra note 51, at 593–611; Dignam & Galanis, supra
note 27, at 221–22 (both comparing the United Kingdom and the United States).
The most known example is maybe the “City Code on Takeovers and Mergers,”
which provides a self-regulatory framework for takeovers favoring shareholder
choice.
285
The Basic State Pension is comparatively low for European standards and
provides an average replacement ratio of only about 15%. Carl Emmerson & Paul
Johnson, Pension Provision in the United Kingdom, in PENSION SYSTEMS AND RETIREMENT
INCOMES ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES 296, 299, 301 (Richard Disney & Paul Johnson
eds., 2001); see also David Blake, The United Kingdom: Examining the Switch from Low
Public Pensions to High-Cost Private Pensions, in SOCIAL SECURITY PENSION REFORM IN
EUROPE, supra note 278, at 317, 317 (noting that public finances are thus less affected
by demographic change). The “State Second Pension” (S2P), which replaced a
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the early 1980s encouraged British firms to shift from traditional DB
286
Since the mid-1990s, the vast majority of new
plans to DC plans.
employer-sponsored plans have been DC plans, and more than half
287
of existing DB plans have been phased out.
This brief comparison reveals a pattern: countries where workers
rely more strongly on government pensions and DB plans than those
in the United States also exhibit less developed pro-shareholder
institutions in their corporate laws. In the case of a stock market
downturn, the modern American worker is immediately affected by
the loss of value of his or her retirement account. With stock markets
288
much smaller relative to GDP and individual household savings
more often held in savings accounts, movements in the stock market
typically do not matter very much for the middle class in these
289
countries.
From the perspective of the Continental European or
Japanese middle-class, it is “rich folks on Wall Street” who lose money
in a stock market downturn. Retirement benefits primarily depend
on the government’s ability and willingness to fund the public
pension system and, in some cases, employers’ ability to pay pensions.
Christopher Bruner has proposed that the United Kingdom
became more shareholder-centric than the United States because the
British welfare state provides more benefits, particularly health care,
than those provided by large firms to their employees in the United
290
States. In other words, U.S. workers are more dependent on their
employers. As this Article shows, the shift from DB to DC plans has
considerably reduced one aspect of dependence not highlighted by
Bruner. While Bruner’s explanation is complementary to this one,
the effects of the change in the pension system are likely even more
consequential, since they turned workers into shareholders.
While it would be beyond the scope of this Article to fully
explore the complex relationships among pension systems, corporate
ownership structures, and possible international convergence toward

similar plan known as SERPS in 2002, allows an opt-out into a private plan.
Emmerson & Johnson, supra note 285, at 303.
286
Munnell, supra note 60, at 371–74; MACKENZIE, supra note 139, at 245–46 (all
discussing changes in the British private pension system).
287
Munnell, supra note 60, at 375.
288
See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1131 (1997).
289
Marcel Tyrell & Reinhard H. Schmidt, Pension Systems and Financial Systems in
Europe: A Comparison from the Point of View of Complementarity, 47 IFO-STUDIEN 469, 488–
89 (2001) (suggesting that German firms with “book reserve” pensions rely less on
capital markets compared to their UK equivalents).
290
Bruner, supra note 51, at 579.
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shareholder primacy, some authors have identified demographic
problems of public PAYGO pension systems both in Europe and
Japan and an increasing international trend toward DC pension plans
as a driver for this form of international convergence in corporate
291
governance.
In Continental Europe and Japan, a connection with
the political movement to push national pension systems into the
direction of the DC paradigm since the early 1990s seems very likely.
Conspicuously, scholars identified some degree of convergence in
corporate governance and a trend toward the shareholder model
292
during the same period.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article argues that the place of shareholder primacy in the
corporate governance system of the United States has shifted, at least
partly due to the change from DB plans to DC plans. When DC plans
predominate, the advantages of shareholder primacy over a more
expansive view of the objective of corporate law weigh more strongly
than they did in the heyday of managerial capitalism.
The
implication is that policies that give more weight to shareholders over
labor have become relatively more desirable. The shift from DB to
DC plans made Americans more directly dependent on capital
markets and thus helped to make shareholder primacy and
shareholder wealth maximization more attractive intellectual
positions.
The impact on the actual politics of corporate governance is
more ambiguous. While a clear causal link is difficult to establish, it
is clear that causation, at least in part, runs from the pension system
to corporate governance. Regulatory changes that pushed the
pension system to where it is today, most of all ERISA, were intended
to protect workers and not the consequence of changes in the
financial system. Thus, these changes in pension law were an
exogenous factor that indirectly and unintentionally helped to
transform corporate governance.
The greater dependence of
workers’ pension wealth on the capital market instead of the
employer possibly resulted in a reduction of firm-specific human
capital, and thus strengthened political support for shareholder
291

GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 22, at 215–17; MATHIAS M. SIEMS,
CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER LAW 289 (2008).
292
See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6; Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing
Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001)
(both discussing convergence of corporate governance practices); Bebchuk & Roe,
supra note 142 (suggesting that path dependence impedes convergence).
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primacy. Many shareholder primacists would probably agree that
pro-shareholder reforms often remain cosmetic.
Nevertheless,
unions, which were once opponents of both management and
shareholders in securing better conditions for workers, were co-opted
into shareholder capitalism through the pension system. The seeds
for the development may have been sowed through the Taft-Hartley
Act’s system of pension plans, run jointly by employers and unions,
but it came to full fruition only when shareholder value started to
become of profound importance to unions and their aging
constituents. Shareholder activism partly originated from institutions
largely operating within the DB paradigm, such as union and public
pension funds, which were also driven to increase equity investment
by regulatory changes from the early 1980s onwards. As far as private
pension funds are concerned, ERISA’s fiduciary and funding
requirements—which also helped to drive investment into DC
plans—contributed to the spread of shareholder activism. With
union pension power declining because of the shift to 401(k) plans,
unions are aware that they need to seek alliances with the managers
293
of these plans to maintain their activist agenda.
History is said to repeat. The end of the economic crisis that
began in 2008 is still not in sight, and the popular press frequently
draws comparisons to the Great Depression of the 1930s. When the
Great Depression devastated private investment in the stock markets
and pension savings, the political response was the introduction of
294
Social Security.
Today, the reaction seems to be the opposite.
During the past three decades, the ubiquitous 401(k) plan has
become the default expectation for retirement benefits in the United
States. A growing number of Americans have become aware of
corporate governance issues and how they affect their retirement
prospects. DC plans are even considered appropriate for public
295
employees, and the Bush administration proposed to convert Social

293

Jacoby, supra note 226, at 56 (discussion of AFL-CIO proxy disclosure); see also
Coffee, supra note 33, at 1987–88 (speculating about a possible decline of pension
fund activism during the rise of 401(k) plans); see, e.g., Gina Chon, Share-Buying Plan
Opposed – Investor Group Resists Proposed SEC Rule to Shorten 13(D) Filing Time Frame,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2011, at B2 (discussing alliances between mutual funds and
pension funds to oppose changes to SEC’s rules that may make coordination
between shareholder activists more difficult).
294
Maria O’Brian Hylton, Evaluating the Case for Social Security Reform: Elderly
Poverty, Paternalism, and Private Pensions, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 749, 751–754 (1998);
CLARK, supra note 164, at 50; CLOWES, supra note 104, at 21; Munnell, supra note 60,
at 362.
295
See Move Public Employees Into 401(k)s?, supra note 214.
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Security into a contribution-based system with individual accounts.
Thus, in spite of criticism, it seems that the shareholder
movement will continue and even gain more strength. With
employees often having the choice between different mutual fund
families, IRAs, and other investment vehicles for their pension
contributions, pressure on institutional investors to exert their
corporate governance role more actively is bound to increase.
Detractors of shareholder primacy often oppose pro-shareholder
reforms on the level of corporations, and sometimes promote reform
proposals that oppose the shareholder-oriented model. This type of
discussion tends to emphasize the corporate governance of firms, the
demand side of the capital market. This Article shows that changes
in the pension system unleashed powerful forces on the supply side
of the capital market that keep pushing corporate governance ever
more strongly toward shareholder primacy. Skeptics of shareholder
primacy must rethink their agenda and address U.S. dependence on
equity investment. Otherwise, attempts to challenge the dominant
model will be futile. Shareholder primacy, with its positive and
negative implications, will be here to stay.

296

E.g., ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 93.

